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Abstract
The failures of post-violent conflict development projects have so far outweighed
the successes. In response, international aid organizations have deepened and broadened
their dedication to state-building projects across all aspects of institution-building, to
include economic, social and political. I chose to examine the implications of this
commitment by looking at Timor-Leste's first local governance project and studying the
relationship between its two main actors: the World Bank and the National Council of
Timorese Resistance. While largely panned as a failure by NGOs, donor organizations and
the government of Timor-Leste itself, this project brought the traditional local leadership
closer to having a true role in governance than similar efforts by any other actor working in
Timor-Leste. A historical analysis of the application of traditional Timorese relationships
with outsiders reveals parallel stories of similar partnerships.
When in Timor, local leaders described to me an interesting story in the Frente
Clandestina, the resistance movement that formed the core of Timor-Leste's proto-
government structure. Counterintuitively, this organization was built on a foundation of
weak relationships and distrust in order to function as an effective military logistical
operation fighting an occupation government. This challenges the literature on social
capital, social cohesion and trust which inadequately describes its relevance to recent
events.
Unfortunately, the collapse of this project demonstrates that divergent agendas,
inaccurate assumptions about state-building by the international community, and the
misuse of terminology such continues to be a fundamental problem. Outbreaks of
violence in recent years have highlighted the problems of ineffective institutional
construction. Timor-Leste was hailed as a model state "built from scratch", but those rosy
predictions have not endured. Its first 10 years of independence can teach us a lot about
the principles of legitimacy, democracy and dignity in the post-violent conflict
development experience of building institutions.
Thesis Advisor: Judith Tendler
Title: Professor of Political Economy, Department of Urban Studies and Planning
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1. Introduction
This thesis explores the first large-scale project that any donor or aid agency implemented
in Timor-Leste. From 2000 to 2004, the World Bank ran the Community Empowerment
and Local Governance Project (CEP). The National Council of Timorese Resistance (CNRT),
a proto-government organization, itself build upon the Frente Clandestina resistance
movement of the 1990s, championed the project for the World Bank. The project was
largely based on an Indonesian community development project that the World Bank had
initially designed with President Suharto in order to bypass his own corrupt provincial
governments.' I will show that the CEP was more successful than other donors and NGOs
have given it credit for because of the project's links to the core traditional elements of
Timorese society. A better understanding of traditional Timorese society as well as how the
project's champion organization, the CNRT, functioned is important for understanding
why this project was more successful than other governance projects in Timor-Leste. I will
show that as a local governance project, the CEP demonstrates that donors do not have to
shy away from the core components of a society because of perceived sensitivity issues.
Traditional, ritual and political factors need to be integrated into development projects free
from the fear of problems with favoritism or legitimacy. This runs counter to Western
democratic ideas of equality, but it runs in line with Timorese democratic ideas of dignity
and respect.
1 Michael Woolcock, "Local Conflict and Development Projects in Indonesia", MIT, MIT, 6 April 2009
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1.1. Motivation
Illustration 1: USS Bonhomme Richard (center) and UNTAET barge (right) from the Dili shoreline
23 February 2000 - The warm morning mist began to part ahead of us, as we approached
the northern coastline of East Timor. My Marine unit aboard the USS Bonhomme Richard
was tasked with providing humanitarian and civic assistance to this new island nation in
southeast Asia.2 We were part of Operation Stabilise, the American component of the
International Force for East Timor. We were told by our commanders that the United
2 U.S. Congress, House, Committee on International Relations, "A Report Regarding Forces in East Timor",
10 6 h' Congress, 2nd sess., 1 March 2000
Nations had asked us to participate as a strategic counterweight to Australia whose historic
support for the Indonesian occupation of Timor detracted from its objectivity. We moved
heavy equipment across the mountains, repaired schools and acted as a buffer against
renewed outbreaks of militia violence. After only a few weeks of operations there we were
back at sea, most of us having quickly forgotten our recent experience there. But not me. I
maintained a strong interest in US foreign policy, military humanitarian operations and
international interventions. I continued to pay attention to developments in Timor-Leste. In
2008, I decided to return, and learn how the Timorese have experienced their state-
building project.
Recent research has criticized the adequacy of donors' commitment to post-violent
conflict development, suggesting that instead of the multi-year assistance programs of the
past, organizations need to consider efforts that span multiple decades.3 Donors and aid
agencies all continue to lengthen their commitments with each state-building project, and
this has been accompanied by a simultaneous self-expansion of their developmental
responsibility. In addition to economic interventions, donors and aid organizations have
required countries to adopt Western-style democratic institutions in order to stabilize their
economies and prepare a business environment more conducive to investment. Some of
the popular metrics used to measure progress in this area include the UNDP's "Human
Development Index", the Heritage Foundation's "Economic Freedom Index" and the
World Bank's "Doing Business Index". Timor-Leste ranked 150 of 177 in "Human
3 Satish Chand and Ruth Coffman, "How Soon Can Donors Exit from Post-Conflict States", Working Paper
Number 141, (Washington: Center for Global Development, 2008), 1-52
15
Development" in 2005, and 168 of 178 in "Doing Business" in 2007. According to the
UNDP, countries emerge from violent conflict with varying degrees of institutional
stability. Some, such as Guatemala, Sri Lanka and Macedonia inherited a largely intact
structure. Others such as Sudan, El Salvador, Mozambique, Angola, Cote d'lvoire and
Burundi came out of violent conflict only partially intact. Lastly there was Liberia, Bosnia-
Herzogovina, Sierra Leone, Somalia and DR Congo which emerged without any
institutions to speak of.4 The World Bank has grouped Timor-Leste in this last category as
well, citing middle-class flight, lack of formal institutions and disintegrated social and
physical cohesion'. That is one way to understand this young nation, but I believe there is
another.
I wanted to know how the international organizations understood Timorese
institutions and how the Timorese understood Western institutions. Naturally, I started off
knowing very little about the local and traditional aspects of Timorese society beyond my
short encounter in 2000. Most of what I had read was framed in Western paradigms and
provided by donors' after-action reports. What I discovered, by way of a footnote from a
World Bank document and a meeting at a hotel in Dili, the capital city of Timor-Leste, was
a rich oral history that has so far eluded the main development literature. That made me
want to find out more. I visited with local leaders and villagers in different parts of the
country who furthered my learning in the dynamics of Timor. The Timorese researchers
4 United Nations Development Program, "Sustaining Post-Conflict Economy Recovery, Lessons and
Challenges", BCPR Occasional Paper 1, (2005), 2-3
5 World Bank, Operations Policy and Country Services, "Fragile States, Good Practices in Country
Assistance Strategies", (2005), 6
whose work I have read and who I have talked to, as well as others from the region, have
been looking at more sociological issues, attempting to explain the Timorese
understanding of history and politics. Some have even theorized new models of national
governance that synthesize Western methods of governmental accountability with
traditional notions of power distribution.6 I feel that the issues I raise in this thesis do not
get the detailed attention they require in the development community.
1.2. Background
Illustration 2: map of Timor-Leste (FKA East Timor) in relation to Australia and Indonesia
Timor-Leste, the eastern half of an island about 350 miles northwest of Australia, is one of
6 For a detailed proposal on integrating traditional Timorese institutions with Western-style governanceinstitutions at national level, see Josh Trindade,"Reconciling Conflicting Paradigms: An East Timorese Vision
of the Ideal State" (2008)
the newest nations in the world, but this land of approximately one million people has a
very long history.7 As one of the primary exporters of sandalwood in the 16 th Century,
Timor's resources were prized from the imperial courts of China to the medieval kings and
queens of Europe. The rapidly expanding seaborne empire of Portugal sought to capture
this valuable trading opportunity for itself.' Within a few decades, Portugal had set up a
number of trading posts on the island and regarded the largely unoccupied territory as one
of their south Asian colonial possessions. The Catholic Church came with the first
Portuguese, but would not figure prominently in Timorese society until the struggle for
independence from Indonesia four centuries later.' In the intervening 400 years,
Portuguese and Dutch traders battled each other for the rights to precious Timorese
resources.
It wasn't until the early 1970s, that Portugal's interest in Timorese affairs began to
wane. Sensing their impending independence from Portugal, the Timorese began to form
political parties and consider how they might manage their own affairs. The 1974 coup in
Portugal accelerated those plans, but differences between the Timorese political parties led
to civil war in 1975.'o Citing the need to prevent a "Communist takeover" in their area of
interest and "unify" the the former Dutch and Portuguese halves of the island of Timor,
neighboring Indonesia invaded and annexed the territory in December of 1975." The
7 For more on the history of Timor-Leste, please see A Brief 450 Year History (section 7.1) in the appendix.
8 Ernst Van Veen and Leonard Bluss6, eds., Rivalry and Conflict: European Traders and Asian Trading
Networks in the 16 "h and 17 th Centuries, Studies in Overseas History #7, (Leiden: CNWS, 2005), 220
9 A.H. de Oliveira Marques, History of Portugal, Volume II: From Empire to Corporate State, (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1972), 253-256
10 ibid
11 Anthony Pecotich and Clifford J. Shultz, II, eds., Handbook of Markets and Economies: East Asia,
Southeast Asia, Australia, New Zealand, (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 2006), 200
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Timorese political parties that had been fighting each other over the future of their recently
de-colonized land quickly turned their guns on the invading Indonesians, beginning a
quarter century cycle of resistance and brutal reprisal.
For 24 years, the Timorese occupied the lowest position in society in their own
land. The Indonesians ran a centralized government and implemented a policy called
"transmigration" through which the state incentivized resettlement from more densely
populated provinces such as Java into more rural provinces like Timor Timur.12 These
Indonesian migrants took most of the government's civil service jobs, leaving only lower
level work for native Timorese. The Asian financial crisis in 1997 set off a wave of events
that eventually broke the Indonesian occupation of Timor-Leste.
1.3. Methodology
I conducted library research and online research for three months prior to travel to Timor-
Leste. Once there, I spent three weeks in three of-Timor's thirteen districts finding contacts
and building links to organizations in the country. I attended traditional ceremonies and
met with one of Timor's kings as well as village chiefs, UN representatives and many
citizens of the new nation. After returning to MIT, I conducted more library and online
research over the course of a semester. Six months later, I returned to Timor-Leste for eight
days to do more contact-building and conduct interviews. I spoke with researchers,
government officials, NGO representatives, traditional leaders and former members of the
12 John G. Taylor, The Price of Freedom, (London: Zed Books, 1999), 124
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resistance. Please refer to the Bibliography (section 6) for a list of all the material I
referenced, and the Methodological Annex (section 7.3) in the appendix for more detail on
my trips, interviewees and contacts. Transcripts of interviews are also available in the
appendix in Interviews & Conversations (section 7.4). These were conducted in
accordance with COUHES protocol (#0807002833).
7.4. Conventions and Terminology
There are a few terms that I would like to provide some clarity on prior to the reader
moving on:
Post-Violent Conflict vs. Post-Conflict - Many authors use the terms "conflict" and "violent
conflict" interchangeably. In this paper, I am talking exclusively about violent conflict.
Conflict without violence is a natural phenomenon and a large component of the Western
definition of democracy. The distinction between non-violent conflict and violent conflict
is important.
Local Governance - According to UN-HABITAT, any government whose mandate is
delegated from a higher level of government to a lower level can be considered to be
"local government".'3 That higher level could be as large as a national government or
13 United Nations Centre for Human Settlements (Habitat), "Towards a World Charter of Local Self-
Government", Joint Consultation Document, (Nairobi: 25 May 1998), 10
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small as a sub-regional municipality. In Timor-Leste, the distinction between a local
government that consists of 75,000 people and one that consists of 100 people has not yet
been made clear. In 1915 there were 5 main kingdoms in Timor. With a colony-wide
population of 377,000 this equalled roughly 75,000 people per kingdom. By 2002, the
population of Timor-Leste had reached about 1,000,000, spread across 13 districts. This
was roughly 75,000 per district. Therefore, today's districts, in terms of population, are
about equal to the size of the kingdoms nearly a century ago. However, many who write
about Timor refer to today's district administrators and their offices as the "local
government". 14 UNDP's Local Governance Support Program in 2006 was also focused on
the district-level territories of 75,000.' On the other hand, the World Bank's local
governance project, CEP, dealt with communities as small as a few hundred citizens. Both
the UN and the World Bank claimed to be running local governance projects. Today, the
Timorese government focuses on village-level governance directly, but continues to have
issues distinguishing between district-level local governance and village-level local
governance. The implementation of an on-again off-again plan to convert the country's
district-level governments into municipalities had in 2008 again been postponed
indefinitely.
Timor-Leste, East Timor, Timor Timur, Portuguese Timor -This country may officially be
14 Jarat Chopra, "Building State Failure in East Timor", Development and Change, 3.55 2002: 979-1000,
985
15 United Nations Development Program, "Local Governance Support Programme: Project Document",
(November 2006)
young, but it has a detailed history that is at least half a millennium old. When the
Portuguese came and brought Timor into their empire, they named it Portuguese Timor.
After the Indonesians took over the land, they renamed it Timor Timur, the 27h province in
Indonesia. English-speaking media referred to it as East Timor, a direct translation of its
Indonesian name. After emerging from the care-taker government of the UN, it adopted a
Portuguese translation, calling itself the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste. In Tetum, the
language most spoken in the country, it is known as the Rep6blika Demokritika Timdr
Lorosa'e. I have attempted to use the topically relevant name throughout the discussions in
this paper. For ease of reading, I sometimes shorten the name simply to Timor.
FALINTIL, FRETILIN, CNRM (see Acronyms on page 9)- As with the country name, there
are many different terms for the resistance movements that fought in Timor-Leste's struggle
for independence. Some authors use these terms interchangeably, but they are actually
distinct organizations with different missions and philosophies. I have taken great care to
use the correct organizational name in each case.
Conselho Nacional da Resistincia Timorense (CNRT) - There are actually two CNRTs.
Much of the literature tends to conflate the organizations. Xanana Gusmdo, one of the
leaders of Timorese resistance, founded the first CNRT in 1999. It was called the National
Council of Timorese Resistance and lasted until 2001. It was initially a political party, but
after merging with the Frente Clandestina, became a proto-government organization. The
second CNRT is a successor in acronym only. Xanana Gusmdo founded this political party
in 2007. The second CNRT is the National Congress for Timorese Reconstruction and was
not involved in the World Bank's local governance project.
1.5. Overview
In the first chapter I give an overview of my introduction to Timor-Leste and attempt to
provide the reader with my perspective. I also present the methodology of my research
and describe a few of the popular terms used in this thesis.
I begin, in chapter two, by introducing the elements needed to understand why the
World Bank's project was more successful than others have written. I begin with an
illustration of the traditional Timorese social structure and show how this has made the
integration of indigenous and exogenous political actors possible. I use examples from
Timor's past to demonstrate this point. I then explain the somewhat elusive story of the
Frente Clandestina resistance movement. After independence, this organization formed the
backbone of the World Bank's local governance project champion, the National Council
of Timorese Resistance (CNRT). In trying to understand the organization, I argue that the
literature of social capital, social cohesion and trust and the discussions of the positive or
negative impacts do not capture the important particulars of this history and its relevance
to more recent outcomes. Lastly, I show the support that the Catholic Church provided to
the Frente Clandestina by filling in gaps in its capabilities.
In the third chapter, I cover the apparent disappearance and reappearance of the
Frente Clandestina. I illustrate how the circumstances surrounding the Indonesian
occupation of Timor began to change the behavior of resistance organizations as Timor's
independence drew near. I then talk about how the United Nations' governance agenda
necessitated its "reappearance".
In the fourth chapter I review the Community Empowerment and Local Governance
Project, run by the World Bank from 2000 - 2004. I explain why its designers created the
project and why it is relevant to Timor-Leste's continued development of local governance.
I point out that while the project has been largely panned as a failure of development by
NGOs, donors and the Timorese government itself, there were actually positive aspects
that took it far beyond the results of other local governance projects by those same actors
in Timor. I address the more general issue of participation in this project, and then reflect
briefly on the impact of terminology and vague definitions, such as "democracy" and
"local governance". The appendices at the end provide some additional detail that may be
of interest to the reader.
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2. A Natural Foundation
Understanding how the Frente Clandestina functioned is important for understanding why
the World Bank's local governance project remains the most viable effort at a local-level
governance-building strategy since Timor-Leste's independence. A better understanding of
the traditional model of Timorese society illustrates how building relationships with
outside groups such as the Portuguese and the Catholic Church was a natural process for
the Timorese. The World Bank needed a strong partner to socialize its local governance
project. The organization it worked with, the National Council of Timorese Resistance
(CNRT), was founded in 1999 by Xanana Gusmio, but its backbone was the Frente
Clandestina resistance movement. By design, it was an organization that was not based on
trusted relationships. Moreover, if we try to categorize it, conventional organizational
theories do not sufficiently explain how this organization survived and functioned. This
organization built itself upon a loose coalition of civilians, resistance fighters and local
government officials who were able to work with each other because of the trust-less
nature of the organization. Its ties to the only other growing organization in Timor during
the Indonesian occupation, the Catholic Church, helped it fill in the gaps in its
capabilities.
25
2.7. Bringing the Outsider In
Incorporating new groups of people from outside the kingdom is a big part of Timorese
cultural tradition, and over the past 450 years has defined Timor-Leste society. The territory
was a colony of the Portuguese empire for 425 years, interrupted only briefly by a
Japanese occupation during World War II. The Catholic Church has had a presence on the
island since Portuguese times and is very active in modern day Timor-Leste. When the
Portuguese began to lost interest in mid-Century, the Indonesians came in and ran Timor as
one of their provinces for nearly 25 years. Since its violent break from Indonesia in 1999
many wealthy nations such as Australia, Japan and the United States, as well as
international organizations such as the United Nations, Red Cross and the World Bank
have maintained a heavy presence here. This subsided briefly in 2005, but outbreaks of
violence by groups of Timorese and the subsequent displacement of 10% of the nation's
population caused a return of that heavy presence the following year. Both in traditional
ceremonies I attended and in conversations I had with villagers in the Vikeke sub-district
of Lacluta, I was told the history of Timor-Leste strictly in terms of these periods. Some of
those I talked to regarded the "international" period with the same disdain with they had
for the Indonesians and Portuguese occupations because of the many unresolved issues
that persist today. In order to understand these relationships better we must first
understand the Timorese tradition of uma lulik.
Throughout all of those periods, the Timorese built relationships with foreigners, but
some of those relationships were more successful than others. The successful ones build
26
upon a system of beliefs common throughout Austronesian societies that power and
authority occupy two circles of influence: the ritual and the political. Originally, this
dualistic nature allowed a society to categorize its beliefs, understand the natural world
around them and manage the daily requirements of a functioning society. Even before
colonists and international aid agencies existed, this belief system helped to explain the
arrival of outsiders and determine how members of the society should interact with them.'16
In Timorese society, the Austronesian dual-natured view of the world is represented
by the idea of uma lulik.17 Ancestors exist in the inner circle of uma lulik. According to
tradition, the ancestors represent the most sacred values and moral code of society, and
have the power to influence events in the real world. Extended families, known as Houses,
occupy the middle and outer circles of uma lulik, as depicted in Illustration 3. A House
that lies in the middle circle wields the ritual power of that society. This circle also
contains fertility, prosperity and peace, considered to be female values. A House here is
responsible for all decisions related to the land and is embodied by the Landlord who has
the power to choose the holders of political authority. Any House lying in the outer circle
of the structure wields political authority, but is subordinate to the middle circle's ritual
authority. Both in turn are subordinate to the authority of the ancestors in the inner circle.
In traditional society, this is usually done through the bonds of marriage. A ritual House, a
Landlord, provides the wife to a male in a House outside the uma lulik structure. The
16 Sofi Ospina and Tanja Hohe, "Traditional Power Structures and the Community Empowerment and Local
Governance Project: Final Report", East Timor Transitional Authority and World Bank, Dili, September
2001, 28-33
17 "uma lulik", Tetum for "sacred house"
male's House gains political power, moving into outer circle of uma lulik. Protection and
security, regarded as male values, exist in the outer circle, so the new political House is
responsible for protecting all the Houses inside of it, including both the ritual House and
the ancestors.18
ma gemen outsider
House minimum) poltical (liuri) power, outs knowledge
ritual (dato) power
1Scred. vsalus (God), morals
Wife-Taker
Illustration 3: the uma lulik: the "sacred house" structure of traditional Timorese society
The advantage of this structure is that there are appropriate roles for both outsiders
and insiders in Timorese society. Since the Landlord determines which House will occupy
18 Josh Trindade, personal interview, 24 January 2009; Josh Trindade, "Reconciling Conflicting Paradigms:
An East Timorese Vision of the Ideal State", 2008, 14
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the position of Outsider, both exogenous and indigenous actors can be tied into the
traditional structure. The Landlord brings the Outsider into the hierarchy of uma lulik
because of the new and foreign knowledge they can add to society. The hierarchy of
Houses is dictated by the time of "arrival". The ancestors come before the Landlord, then
the Landlord brings in the Outsider. Subsequent newcomers occupy lower rungs on the
hierarchy and this arrangement expands ad infinitum."9 The minimum number of Houses
needed to maintain the entire system is three, but by using marriage or blood-oaths to
bring outside Houses into the system, many tightly-bonded kingdoms with hundreds of
Houses formed across present day Timor-Leste and West Timor. Timorese society considers
the most senior political Houses in this structure to have "royal blood". The kings of
Wehale and Sonebait that the Portuguese first encountered when they arrived were the
leaders of the most senior political Houses at that time.20
The Portuguese tried very hard to blend their administration with the traditional
hierarchy. Many of them intermarried, a practice the Portuguese administration did not
actively discourage. As immigrant Portuguese created social and economic bonds with the
locals they met, they fulfilled the traditional role of the Outsider and defended the locals
in their battles against other Timorese kingdoms. 21 Certainly, the Portuguese also benefited
from this arrangement. Maintaining a good relationship with coastal people who could
ensure their continued trading prosperity protected their financial interests. Some say that
19 Tanja Hohe, "The Clash of Paradigms: International Administration and Local Political Legitimacy in East
Timor", Contemporary Southeast Asia. 24.3 December 2002:569-589, 572-574
20 Ospina and Hohe, 22
21 John G. Taylor, East Timor: The Price of Freedom, (London: Zed Books, 1999), 4
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the Timorese voluntarily adopted Portuguese customs in order to mislead and outwit the
colonists.22 In 1699, visitors to Lifau, in the present day district of Oe-Kusi, remarked how
though everyone spoke Portuguese, only a handful appeared ethnically European. 23
However, this arrangement seems much more purposeful on the part of the Portuguese.
The Portuguese did not have sufficient resources to maintain control of their colony in
Timor. They found intermarriage to be an effective way to gain political power and
leverage the resources of the island. Portugal certainly had difficulty projecting its military
so far from home, or else they would have been able to push back neighboring Dutch
imperial interests much sooner.24 Portugal itself was a small nation in Europe and had
trouble recruiting its own citizens to serve on the long military and merchant voyages
throughout Estado da India. 25 Eventually, the majority of its naval conscripts came from its
colonies in other parts of the empire rather from than the homeland.
By the early 1900s the Portuguese wished to take more direct control of their
colony in Timor. They had greatly increased their commercial interests on the island by
introducing coffee, a cash crop, in the late 1800s. Then rumors of oil discoveries began to
spread in 1920s.26 In 1934, the Portuguese administration ceased to recognize the
authority of the political heads of the kingdoms (liurai) and turned instead to the political
22 ibid, 10
23 C.R. Boxer, The Portuguese Seaborne Empire 1415-1825, (London: Hutchinson & Co.,1969), 143-146
24 The Dutch and the Portuguese fought a protracted campaign back and forth across the island of Timor
from the late 1 500s through the 1800s. For more information see Ernst Van Veen and Leonard Bluss6,
eds., Rivalry and Conflict: European Traders and Asian Trading Networks in the 16 th and 17th Centuries,
Studies in Overseas History #7, (Leiden: CNWS, 2005), 220-227
25 "Estado da India", Portuguese for "State of India", embodying their southern hemisphere maritime
strategy from the 1500s - 1900s
26 Australian Financial Review, 29 May 2006
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heads of the villages, the village chiefs. However, according to uma lulik, the Portuguese
lacked the ritual authority necessary to appoint and replace political heads.27 The
Portuguese administration's new laws had no effect on the practical exercise of power
because they had no basis with which to change the outer circles of Timorese kingdoms.
The Portuguese were in the outer circle as well. Timorese continued to recognize the
relationships between the traditional political figures and the ritual authority despite the
changes in law. Village chiefs continued to descend from Houses with royal blood,
respecting the sequence of authority laid out by ritual authority in the past. 28
The Portuguese continued to try to alter the political landscape in Timor by placing
Portuguese symbols of authority into the most sacred positions of traditional society. By
moving the Portuguese flag and the Bible into the inner circle of uma lulik, they believed
they could gain enough ritual authority (in other words, shift from the outer circle to the
middle circle) to force the traditional political authority to shift from the kings to the
village chiefs.29 In my experiences in Timor-Leste, it has taken until the generation born
after 1980 for this idea to fully take root. When discussing liurai with older Timorese, they
frequently assumed I was referring to the kings, whose royal lineage continues to be
recognized in Timor-Leste, despite their decline in political power. The younger generation
regards the village chiefs of today as the liurai. The common terminology for traditional
political leadership, liurai, thus decreasingly referred to the kings of old and increasingly
referred to the village chiefs throughout the districts.
27 Trindade, 24 January 2009
28 Ospina and Hohe, 49
29 Trindade, 24 January 2009
Curiously, use of the term liurai has shifted concurrently with the Catholic Church's
rise in popularity in Timor. Soon after Portugal pushed its decentralization of indigenous
political power, its interest in its colonies began to wane. The Catholic Church, a partner of
Portugal throughout its imperial adventures, increasingly inserted itself into development
issues. The Church took advantage of previous Portuguese inroads into uma lulik. The
Portuguese had inserted the Bible into the sacred center as a symbol of ritual power, so the
Church had merely to continue that association. Catholic priests began to refer to
themselves as amu lulik, Tetum for "sacred Father".30 However, the Church was not nearly
as aggressive as the Portuguese. After nearly 300 years of mission work ,the Church had
managed to convert only 30% of the nation of 500,000 to Catholicism by the time of the
Indonesian invasion in 1975.31
Only a handful of Indonesians tried to adopt the strategies that the Portuguese and
the Church had used to gain legitimacy. In one account reported by Ospina and Hohe, a
village chief from the Baukau district spoke of a 1984 blood-oath between himself and a
military commander from the Indonesian military.32 The new agreement apparently
quelled the violence and prevented more people from dying, but it is unclear whether this
really furthered the political legitimacy of the Indonesian government in Timor. Moreover,
this kind of relationship-building by the Indonesians and the Timorese was much less
frequent than the overt use of force by the military. The Indonesian government outlawed
30 Trindade, 24 January 2009
31 Anthony Pecotich and Clifford J. Shultz, II, eds., Handbook of Markets and Economies: East Asia,
Southeast Asia, Australia, New Zealand, (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 2006), 219
32 Ospina and Hohe, 60
any adherence to the traditional system of authority. It recognized ritual and political
traditions but only as non-substantive customs.33 Hollowing out the source of sacredness at
the core of the Timorese value system while still recognizing the ritual and political
manifestations of authority did not work to the Indonesian's advantage. Even efforts by
President Suharto to celebrate the ritual traditions of Timor fell flat, failing to garner any
meaningful support from Timorese society.34
The actions of the pro-integration militias after the referendum best expressed
Indonesia's frustration with its failure to make inroads into Timorese society. Timorese
society embodies much of the symbology and ideology of their ancestral Houses in their
physical structures. Many Timorese that I spoke with showed me photographs of their
family's traditional homes and explained the various motifs and meanings embedded in
the architecture. In August 1999, when the militias set fire to most of the urban and rural
infrastructure in the country, they were symbolically burning down Houses as they burnt
down people's homes.35
Fighting centuries-old notions of traditional societies was important for the
Indonesians right up until the last day of occupation because those traditions lay at the
core of Timorese society. The values uma lulik embodied were as important to those
resisting occupation as at any other time. The Frente Clandestina resistance movement,
who formed the core of the World Bank's Community Empowerment and Local
33 Trindade, 24 January 2009
34 Pecotich and Shultz, 220
35 Andrew McWilliam, "Houses of Resistance in East Timor: Structuring Sociality in the New Nation",
Anthropological Forum, 15.1 March 2005: 27-44, 28, 31
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Governance Project champion, the CNRT, would use the ideas contained in uma lulik to
make themselves more resilient.
2.2. From FRETILIN to Frente
By 1990, the increasingly brutal tactics of the Indonesian military had forced the Timorese
to reorient the organization of their resistance to fight a more asymmetrical conflict that
pitted their organizational and fighting strengths against the Indonesians' weak spots. The
new National Council of Maubere Resistance (CNRM) grouped together disparate
components of military and political opposition. Elements from within the CNRM as well
as the traditional leadership throughout the country formed a shadow government
structure called the Frente Clandestina in order to more effectively coordinate and supply
the opposition forces. The Clandestina sustained itself remarkably well through the
decade, surviving on the merits of its internal structure and its connections to other more
visible organizations.
Soon after the 1975 invasion, the Timorese began to fight a fairly successful war of
resistance against the Indonesians, but that did not last very long. By 1979, the FALINTIL
resistance movement was broken. 6 It had been relatively easy for the civilians to resupply
the FALINTIL in the mountains, but the Indonesian military resettled most of the
population in work camps on highly-guarded valley plantations. Nicolau dos Reis Lobato,
president of the FRETILIN opposition group was killed at the end of 1978, throwing its
36 Taylor, 94-153
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leadership into disarray.
Despite this low point, the situation began to improve for the Timorese resistance
movement in the early 1980s. However, it would again take a turn for the worse towards
the end of the decade. The lone, surviving member of the original FRETILIN leadership,
Xanana Gusmio, assumed the presidency of the organization in 1981. By 1983, the
resistance movement had gained enough strength to cause the Indonesian military to
request a ceasefire which the leaders of FRETILIN agreed to. In spite of the ceasefire
agreement, the Indonesian military launched the second Operasi Keamanan, or "fence of
legs" campaign, in 1984, forcing civilians to form a human chain and march across the
island, in an attempt to weed out insurgents.3 7
With an increasing number of setbacks, thinned out combat forces and a
population near the breaking point, the groups opposing the Indonesian occupation
needed to reorganize themselves. Gusmao resigned from the FRETILIN and in 1990
created the CNRM. The CNRM was to be the diplomatic front for all groups resisting the
occupation. It was also to be the shell under which all the resistance movements could
regroup, exchange information and share materiel. The FALINTIL became the CNRM's
primary armed faction. Its biggest challenge was how to resupply in an environment where
all the resources they needed were located in guarded plantations instead of mountain
villages. The CNRM needed to create a logistical support structure that could operate in
the same locations as the occupying Indonesian forces and not be compromised.
37 "Operasi Keamanan", Bahasa Indonesian for "Operation Security"
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Illustration 4: a historical comparison of administrations in Timor-Leste
The Frente Clandestina developed around 1991 and effectively placed a new local
governance structure inside the one that was already working with the Indonesian
government. At that time Timorese village chiefs in each district reported to a camat, an
Indonesian district-level administrator. Their relationship was much like their prior one
with the Portuguese adminstrador de posto. Illustration 4 shows the equivalent government
roles of current and past administrations of Timor-Leste. The Clandestina created a position
parallel to the village chief, the nucleos de resistancia popular (nurep), responsible for
organizing village support for the FALINTIL. According to discussions I had with village
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leaders in Timor, the FALINTIL commanders in consultation the traditional leadership of
the village usually chose the nureps.3 8 Many of the nureps had royal blood, that is they
came from Houses with political power. According to uma lulik, this ensured their
traditional legitimacy. By supporting the Clandestina traditional leaders gained more
political clout. Security and protection were an important part of uma lulik's outer circle.
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Illustration 5: the structure of the Frente Clandestina (1990-1998)
The celcom, played a vital role in the Clandestina, directly linking the Clandestina,
the FALINTIL commanders and the local government. Illustration 5 depicts the relationship
38 Silvano Cardoso, personal interview, 29 January 2009; Corneilo da Costa, personal interview, 29 January
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between the various roles in the Frente Clandestina. One of the hamlet leaders I spoke
with in Timor explained to me his old role as a kaixa.3 9 After our conversation, it became
apparent that the kaixa and the celcom were one and the same. His job was to go from
door-to-door at night soliciting for support from the people of the hamlet. It is his belief
that many of the hamlet chiefs in Timor also fulfilled the role of ce/com in the Clandestina.
Hamlet chiefs (xefe aldeia) were insulated from the Indonesian government because they
only reported to the Timorese village chiefs (xefe suku) above them. A village chief from
Lourba that I spoke with echoed the hamlet chief's description of night-time solicitations.40
The Clandestina's full story remains as elusive as the members themselves. Firstly, it
only operated at night. Conducting resupply operations in the daytime was not possible
under military occupation. Second, some of the individuals who were part of the
Clandestina also worked for the Indonesian administration. The former members of the
Clandestina that I spoke with told me that they typically did not inform the villagers who
they were directly supporting.41 This high level of secrecy protected the organization and
the individuals working in it. If someone was captured, they did not know enough to give
away a significant piece of the organization. Even the estafata who collected food and
supplies gathered by the kaixa had no idea who had made the donations they carried to
the FALINTIL. This secrecy allowed the Clandestina to thrive against some very
overwhelming odds.
The Clandestina is a confounding organization. It existed only informally within the
39 Luis, personal interview, 30 January 2009
40 Cardoso
41 ibid; Luis
CNRM, entirely "off the books" for the duration of its existence with most of its members
never knowing each other. They did not record their actions or codify their procedures.
Many of the role descriptions and even the name of the organization came well after the
Clandestina had begun operations. Members were loosely associated with one another
and yet by all accounts, considered themselves to have a very cohesive network. The
group had a long-term focus that placed more emphasis on the successful outcome of the
group effort, rather than on benefits for the individual.
Repressive laws and living conditions excluded the Timorese from participating in a
productive Indonesian society. Most civilians, by 1990 lived in the model villages in the
valleys. The FALINTIL's inability to supply itself led directly to the creation of the
Clandestina. Putnam's research of civic associations in Italy illustrated groups created by
exclusion from socioeconomic systems.42 Many have extrapolated his discoveries to apply
to situations outside of Italy, but this reasoning doesn't sufficiently account for the means
by which that exclusion occurred. The method of that exclusion would certainly have had
an effect on the dynamics of that organization.
In Timor, fear of the Indonesian occupation was severe enough to force the
Timorese to organize the Clandestina's shadow government structure. Uphoff 's work on
social capital introduced the qualification of relationships.43 He divided the codified
relations between people, networks and associations from the set of forces driving the
42 Robert D. Putnam, Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy, (Princeton: Princeton
Univ. Press, 1993), 168
43 Partha Dasgupta and Ismail Serageldin, eds, Social Capital: A Multi-Faceted Perspective, (Washington:
World Bank. 2001), 215-220
relationships between them. The first component he called structural and the second
component, cognitive. Building on this idea, Mcllwaine and Moser's research
demonstrated that fear can also be a big component of cognitive social capital. 44 So can
social capital explain how this organization retained its cohesiveness?
In order to form a shadow government, the Clandestina needed to be a cohesive
organization, just as the leaders I spoke with claimed.45 Colletta and Cullen defined social
cohesiveness as the degree to which linkages between peers and linkages up and down
the ladder of power intersect each other.46 They argued that a proper balance of horizontal
and vertical linkages would result in a stronger and better-glued society. Conflict weakens
the bonds and bridges created by social capital, resulting in an environment of reduced
trust and damaging this cohesion.47 Mcllwaine and Moser also discovered in their
Guatemala and Colombia research that violence and force could erode social capital and
break down social cohesion. 48 Both Varshney in India and Colletta and Cullen in Rwanda
found that inwardly-focused groups perpetrated many of the violent conflicts there. They
attributed the problems they found to a lack of relationships between Hindus and
Muslims, and Hutu and Tutsi, respectively.49 However, Uphoff's structural social capital
framework does not allow groups to function in isolation. According to that logic, it is
44 Cathy Mcllwaine and Caroline O.N. Moser, "Violence and Social Capital in Urban Poor Communities:
Perspectives from Colombia and Guatemala", lournal of International Development, 13 2001: 965-984,
2001, 980
45 Luis; Cardoso
46 Nat J. Colletta and Michelle L. Cullen, "The Nexus Between Violent Conflict, Social Capital and Social
Cohesion", Social Capital Initiative, Working Paper No. 23, World Bank, September 2000, 4
47 ibid, 25
48 Mcllwaine and Moser, 975
49 Ashutosh Varshney, "Ethnic Conflict and Civil Society: India and Beyond", World Politics, 53 2001: 362-398,
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inaccurate to say that any two groups lack ties between them. Acknowledging that a
fearful, animosity-filled relationship existed between Varshney's Hindu organizations and
their Muslim counterparts would better describe the reality.
Timorese citizens had very little opportunity to build vertical linkages in their
society. The position that they occupied in the Indonesian province was relatively flat and
low in the overall hierarchy. Very few positions of power were given to native Timorese,
and yet by all accounts this society was very cohesive, with nation-wide resistance
movements that survived very strong opposing forces. Looking at a number of post-violent
conflict cases in Africa, Aron discovered that while there were losses of social capital in
Sierra Leone and Rwanda, a few, such as Eritrea, actually saw an increase in social capital
during the conflict.s0 This inconsistency puts Aron and Mcllwaine and Moser at odds with
each other, making the overall social capital definition less convincing.
Downward pressure from the Indonesian government and military actually
enhanced social cohesion in Timor by creating the first cross-kingdom sense of national
identity. Just a few years before the Clandestina appeared, Jose Ramos-Horta wrote in his
autobiography that there were three unifying elements of Timorese life: the resistance
movement, the Tetum language and the Catholic Church." At that time the Church had
followers in less than 50% of the nation and the Tetum language had 22 dialects, but the
resistance stretched across the entire province, from Lospalos to Maliana. Varshney said
that associational organizations were particularly strong for peace and stability because
50 Janine Aron, "Building Institutions in Post-Conflict African Economies", lournal of International
Development, 15 2003: 471-485, 474
51 Jos6 Ramos-Horta, Funu: The Unfinished Saga of East Timor, (Trenton: The Red Sea Press, 1987), 205
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they could absorb exogenous shocks.5 2 Colletta and Cullen found that vertical forces in
Rwanda were so strong that local leaders who had chosen pacifism or attempted to grant
asylum to Tutsi were coerced by higher levels of government to participate in or permit the
killings in their village. Powerful Hutu leaders in Rwanda, acting in the name of the state,
declared that it was the civic duty of all Hutu to cleanse their society of the Tutsi.53 Colletta
and Cullen also discovered that Rwandan villagers blamed exogenous market forces and
the introduction of money-based transactions for damaging their inter-group trust and
intra-group mutual assistance organizations. They said those forces were at least as
damaging than the violent conflict itself.54 The vertical penetration of other actors was so
strong that it damaged their horizontal bonds, throwing social cohesion off balance.
However, Timorese society and uma lulik specifically is designed to incorporate
exogenous shocks. It has proven quite resilient over the last 450 years.
The Catholic Church was one of the few other organizations that grew stronger
during the conflict in Timor, its membership rising from 30% of the population in 1975 just
prior to the invasion to over 90% by the time of independence. Colletta and Cullen found
that coping organizations sustained themselves particularly well throughout violent
conflict. These organizations stood out because their intra-organizational ties actually
increased over the course of the conflict. Mcllwaine and Moser made similar findings in
Guatemala and Colombia, discovering that the strongest and most trusted organizations in
civil society were consistently the women's groups and churches who served as support
52 Varshney, 368
53 Colletta and Cullen, 19, 22
54 ibid, 24
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groups for victims of violent conflict.55
The Clandestina was an alternative to the existing formal governance institution of
the Indonesian state. Helmke suggested that a stable pattern of behavior that doesn't
conform to formal rules is evidence of an informal organization in operation.56 The
logistical support that kept the FALINTIL resupplied and operational is evidence of the
Clandestina's existence. That a nation-wide governmental structure could emerge
seemingly overnight after the passage of the autonomy referendum is further proof that
some kind of structure existed in the shadows. Helmke would call the Clandestina a
substitutive organization because it replaced the existing but ineffective open market
logistical system for the FALINTIL.
The paradox is that the FALINTIL and the traditional leadership were short-term
beneficiaries of this new organization, but the civilians were not. The traditional leaders
enjoyed increases in the stock of their political and social capital. Their hand was
strengthened by association with the FALINTIL and the Clandestina, who were both highly
regarded as strong embodiments of male values of protection and security in the
framework of uma lulik. 7 The FALINTIL fighters benefited by having a new resupply
mechanism. Civilians, on the other hand, did not gain any direct social or economic
benefit from this association, unless the resistance was successful. Ostrom would argue
here that investment in long-term benefit over short-term cost is a formative stage in the
55 Mcllwaine and Moser, 980
56 Gretchen Helmke and Steven Levitsky, "Informal Institutions and Comparative Politics: A Research
Agenda", Perspectives on Politics, 2.4 December 2004: 725-740, 733
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construction of social capital.58 This benefited the FALINTIL fighters but is still an
insufficient explanation for civilian participation.
By joining the Clandestina, civilians could ensure that their leaders in the hamlets
and villages would continue to act in their best interests, comfortable with the fact that
those leaders were still part of the provincial government. This soft power gave the
traditional leadership a sense of obligation towards the group, effectively giving the group
loose control over their actions. Tsai found a similar dynamic in rural China. There
embedding local officials in an organization that was open to everyone in the community
created a "solidary" group, providing an informal institution of accountability.9 A member
of the local government could be part of one of these solidary groups, usually a temple or
community organization. 60 The group then would increase the moral standing of that
member of the government by praising him for an action of his that had benefitted the
community.
Weak ties between members of the Clandestina allowed the organization to survive
some rather overwhelming odds. Granovetter looked at many different groups of people
and discovered that those that were weakly bonded internally were more likely to survive
in the long term." Groups with tight bonds, on the other hand, only had the appearance of
cohesiveness, and in reality were actually quite fractured. The problem he discovered was
58 Dasgupta and Serageldin, 183-193
59 For more on "embedding", see Peter Evans, Embedded Autonomy, Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1995
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China, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 4-15
61 Mark S. Granovetter, "The Strength of Weak Ties", The American lournal of Sociology, 78.6 May 1973:
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that the tightly-bonded groups he observed were not able to expand themselves or link to
other groups and so over time died off.
The Clandestina could not rely on social capital and positive relationship-building
or it would have compromised its own protection mechanism. Members of the
Clandestina only knew the next link in their chain of operations. They shared minimal
inter-personal information with each other in order to protect themselves and the group if
captured. They operated as secretly as possible, taking only small risks. Cook, Hardin and
Levi pointed out that relationships based on trust between people and groups are more
rare than people assume. Distrust actually fosters the development of cooperation,
because networks are forced to remain open.62 This allows groups to easily absorb new
members and expunge ones that hurt the group. Members that were in a position to hurt
the organization, like government officials working for the Indonesian government, could
be held in check. As Locke pointed out, trust within organizations is really situational and
relational, not personal.6' As such, it can be built over time. Trust and ties remained as
minimal as needed for members of the Clandestina to accomplish their missions.
The Clandestina succeeded as an organization because people could participate
without investing too much of themselves into it. Trust was not required for it to function.
Social cohesion in this case was more a result of people working together and building ties
based on uma lulik and due less to a social-capital based frequency of interaction. Some
have called this merely the appearance of cohesion, but in Timor, resistance movements
62 Karen S. Cook, Russell Hardin and Margaret Levi, Cooperation without Trust, Russell Sage Foundation
Publications, 2005, 4, 81, 92
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were nation-wide and well-coordinated. The Clandestina, via the CNRT, thus provided the
World Bank with a strong, national, reputable and accountable organization with which to
push its local governance initiative. But prior to independence and prior to merging with
the CNRT, the Clandestina still had some gaps in its capabilities. For that it would have to
turn to the only other organization growing during Indonesian times.
2. 3. Praying for Survival
When I had asked village leaders about the role of the Church in the affairs of the
traditional leadership, they pointed me instead towards the relationship between the
Church and the Clandestina.64 The Clandestina was good at dealing with a specific set of
issues, but some issues were beyond the capabilities of the organization. The Clandestina
had quickly mastered the art of supply chain management and organizational efficiency,
but recognized that it needed help communicating with other organizations and securing
the release of captured group members. The Clandestina's messengers, the celcom, could
only operate at night, and the requirement for secrecy meant that they could only shuttle
information between the nureps of the hamlets and villages and the FALINTIL
commanders. They could not communicate with other ce/com to gain awareness of the
larger situational picture. The Church, however, did not have such limitations. They were
present in every district, every sub-district and in all of the large villages. They were
accountable only to the the Papal state and so could communicate between villages and
64 Cardoso; Da Costa
districts without much interference from the Indonesian government. As one of the only
other organizations growing stronger during the occupation, it is fitting that the
Clandestina's most beneficial relationship was with the Catholic Church. The Church had
ties with many organizations in Timor-Leste, but it is worth understanding the history of the
Church in Timor and exploring this particular relationship." The Catholic Church and the
Clandestina were the two actors that the large donors would initially rely upon to help
them engage the local population.6 6
With its large population, Indonesia was an important part of the Church's ongoing
goal to increase the size of its membership. The Church had been in parts of Indonesia
since it was a Dutch colony, but only began rapidly expanding its presence after the
Protestant empire relinquished its colony in 1965. Catholicism is one of the only two
Christian religions approved by the Indonesian government and only one of six allowed in
total. Its popularity grew in the 2 0 th Century because Indonesians regarded it as non-
communist and non-Chinese. This was important to many Indonesians as they strove for
independence. From this position of strength and influence, the Church was able to act in
the Timor Timur province with virtual impunity. It frequently served as a conduit for
65 People had more faith in the reliability of information coming from the Church than that from the local
government. Cooperativa Caf6 Timor (CCT) in Dili, a coffee cooperative started in 1994 by the National
Cooperative Business Association (NCBA) also used the Church's information dissemination mechanism.
When I spoke with CCT members in Timor, they told me a similar story of Church support for capabilities
their organization lacked in the 1990s. When CCT wanted to tell farmers about coffee processing or
coffee marketing, they would rely on the Church to pass the word along. At Sunday mass farmers
received CCT's updated pricing information. After Timor-Leste's independence, this practice continued.
That this continues today may speak to the effectiveness of current Timorese local governance efforts. In
order to survive as an organization, the Clandestina, like the CCT relied upon the Church. I spoke with
Bency Isaac on 29 January 2009 and Eusebio Diaz Quintas on 30 January 2009 regarding operations at
CCT.
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organizations within the province that wanted to reach members of the Timorese diaspora.
As such, its role in Timorese society quickly expanded with the Indonesian occupation.
The Church found a dedicated following to enlarge its base and the Timorese found an
advocate in their own drive for independence.
The Church was not always so involved with the internal affairs of the Timorese,
however. It had been in Timor for hundreds of years before it began to play a role that
could be characterized as pro-Timorese. Just before the Church arrived with the first
Portuguese traders in Timor, it had begun its post-medieval reformation. In Portugal, the
Ecclesiastical Council of 1567 decreed that only orthodox-style Roman Catholicism was
permitted; that the Crown of Portugal had a duty to spread the Roman Catholic faith; and
that the conversion of subjects should be pursued, but without the use of force. From
there, the padroado real remained the guiding principle for maintaining Portugal's
territorial claims well into the 20'h Century.67 When the Portuguese began arriving in Timor,
the Catholic missionaries accompanying immediately started the work of seeking
converts." Over the next 400 years the number of Catholics in Portuguese Timor remained
historically low at about 13% of the population, but would eventually have membership
numbers in excess of 90% by the turn of the 2 1 st Century.69
One of the reasons that the Catholic Church's membership took off in the latter half
of the 20 th Century was its increased involvement in primary and secondary education. In
67 "padroado real", Portuguese term meaning "union of the Church and the Portuguese Crown"
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1941, the Church in Timor took over primary education responsibilities from the
Portuguese colonial authority.70 The Japanese destroyed most of the schools in Portuguese
Timor during the course of its seizure and occupation in World War II. Despite this
setback, the Church rebuilt the primary system and expanded into secondary education in
the 1950s." The Church's persistent push into education gave it newfound credibility in
the eyes of the Timorese. Its leverage of Portuguese inroads into uma lulik helped as well.
In 1975 the Church appointed Monsignor Martinho da Costa Lopes as vicar-
general, the first native-born Timorese to lead the Catholic Church in Timor.72 Under Dom
Martinho, the Church continued to expand its education programs, funded by the global
Catholic congregation. After the 1975 invasion, the Indonesian government quickly set up
their own school system, but required all public schools to teach only Javanese culture. As
a result, the Tetum and Portuguese languages could only be taught in Catholic schools. 73
This became the only legal place for Timorese to learn and discuss their culture. Over the
next several years, Dom Martinho became an outspoken critic of the Indonesian
occupation of Timor. The Church leadership in Jakarta, seeking to maintain its good
relationship with the Indonesian government, forced his 1983 resignation. The Indonesian
government then helped the Church select a more malleable replacement.
In 1983, Bishop Carlos Felipe Ximenos Belo became the head of the Timorese
diocese. Much to the surprise of both the Indonesian government and the Church, Bishop
70 Taylor, 13
71 De Oliveira Marques, 256
72 Rowena Lennox, Fighting Spirit of East Timor: The Life of Martinho da Costa Lopes, (Annandale: Pluto
Press, 2000), vii
73 Taylor, 128
Belo was even more outspoken than his predecessor. Over the next few years, he
successfully lobbied elements of the Church leadership in Jakarta to raise concerns with
the central government over human rights abuses in Timor Timur. He was even able to get
the ear of the Pope. The Pope visited Timor-Leste in October of 1989, holding a mass
attended by nearly 100,000, the Church's popularity having already grown substantially
since 1975. 74 Massive public demonstrations followed his visit, drawing international
attention to the plight of the Timorese. Bishop Belo continued to speak out about the
Indonesian occupation throughout the 1980s, and was eventually recognized by the
international community with a Nobel Peace Prize in 1996 along with Ramos-Horta.
While the Church's popularity was rising in the 1990s, many of the resistance
movements were losing their leadership. In November 1992, Gusmio was jailed in Java,
where he would remain until 1999. Ramos-Horta worked the international scene, pitching
diplomatic solutions to the UN and the powerful nations of the world. As a result, there
was no one left in the province with sufficient political capital to maintain opposition. The
FALINTIL, the military component of the CNRM, shrank to its smallest size between 1991
and 1994, but did not disappear, thanks to the support of the Clandestina. With no other
powerful actors remaining, the Clandestina had become the primary means of domestic
resistance to the occupation.
The Church served a vital role linking elements of Timorese society together as well
as supporting institutions with gaps in their capacity. For the Clandestina, the Church
matched their highly visible activities spotlighting the Timorese situation, with behind-the-
74 ibid, 152-157
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scenes support. Village chiefs that I spoke with in Timor-Leste told me that without the
Church's support, captured members of the Clandestina or FALINTIL would never have
returned.7 Priests could go to the Indonesian military or government officials to secure
their release. Clandestina members, the CNRM leadership and the FALINTIL commanders
could not do this on their own. In the same manner, the Clandestina relied upon the
Church to help them with shuttling information in and out of the province. The jailed head
of the CNRM as well as the Timorese diaspora were able to stay connected to the
Clandestina through the Church. While it never dissolved, the primacy of the Clandestina's
role in the resistance movement would not last the rest of the occupation.
75 Cardoso; Da Costa
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3. A Resistance Movement in Transition
Even with the solid foundation of traditional Timorese society and the support of the
Church, events surrounding the Indonesian occupation of Timor began to alter the
conditions in which the Frente Clandestina operated. Better covert operations by the
Indonesian military and more overt resistance by a new generation of Timorese students
made the FALINTIL, whom the Clandestina were supporting, less effective. The structure
and mission of the Frente Clandestina did not appear to last through the final years of the
resistance, but in reality went dormant until post-independence conditions necessitated its
return. The following is the brief story of its fade and subsequent reappearance.
3.7. Where for Art Thou Clandestina?
Towards the latter half of the 1990s, the Frente Clandestina began to decrease its activities.
One reason was that the shrinking size of the FALINTIL resistance fighters' force resulted in
lower demand for the Clandestina's logistical support activities. However, the Clandestina
continued to coordinate resistance activities through their shadow governance structure
and ties to the Catholic Church. Operations may have been reduced, but they remained
the only resistance organization that had the ability to coordinate across the Timor Timur
province. Other forces continued to drive down demand for Clandestina services, but it
did not disappear, it merely went dormant for a a few years. Even stories of its activities
became scarce, but it would reemerge strongly soon after Timor achieved its
independence from Indonesia.
The international situation was changing the conditions in which the Clandestina
operated. An increasing number of exogenous events was making the Indonesian
occupation of Timor less sustainable. The awarding of Nobel prizes to Bishop Belo and
Ramos-Horta in 1996 had brought renewed international attention to the Timorese struggle
for independence.7' Portugal began to press the United Nations for support for
autonomous rule in its former colony of Timor.7 The only country that seemed to buck the
trend of international pressure was Australia, who had signed a treaty in 1990 with the
Indonesian government for oil and gas extraction in the Timor Sea.78 The atmosphere was
changing inside Indonesia as well, however.
A new generation of student activists in both Indonesia and the Timor Timur
province were regularly taking to the streets and pushing the envelope of acceptable
protest. Many young Timorese students, educated in schools in Jakarta, were directly
influenced by their Indonesian classmates' struggle against the central government. In the
capital city, Indonesian students were increasingly vocal in their opposition to the
repressive policies of the Suharto regime. This experience inspired the Timorese students
and expanded the resistance options available to this younger generation of Timorese. One
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of the Timorese citizens that I worked with in Timor-Leste described to me his account of a
1997 student protest he participated in Dili. 79 He had been pro-Indonesia throughout high
school, but after witnessing atrocities committed by the military, felt compelled to partake
in protests against the occupation. He described to me the feeling of unity he shared with
his fellow students as he held a banner in front of the Indonesian troops, caring less for his
own life than the passion of the cause. This was a different form of resistance than that
which had brought together the members of the Clandestina: these students were out in
the open and exposed to violent retaliation.
The 1997 Asian financial crisis accelerated the changes that were happening
concurrently in Indonesian politics. Suharto was forced to resign amidst massive protests
following the rapid devaluation of the ruppiah, the Indonesian national currency. The
following year, at the urging of Portugal and the United Nations, the new Indonesian
president, Habibie, floated the idea of an autonomy resolution for Timor Timur. In January
1999 he announced his decision to go forward with his plan.80 He had not consulted the
highly influential military leadership about this decision beforehand, so there was much
confusion in his government about how and when this would actually take place.
It has been well-documented that over the course of the 1990s, the Indonesian
military retreated from most of its overt activities and began executing smaller, more covert
operations with commando units and plain-clothes troops."' The Indonesian military's
special forces, the Kopassus, began operations recruiting indigenous militias sympathetic
79 Armindo da Costa, personal interview, 27 January 2009
80 Greenless, xi
81 John Matinkus, A Dirty Little War, Random House Australia, 2001
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to the Indonesian cause in order to reinforce the occupation. The Indonesian government
also more actively attempted to restrict media access to the province as reporters
increasingly exposed atrocities committed by the military. Because the Indonesian military
had been caught off guard by Habibie's announcement, they hastily launched Operasi
Sapu Jagad and stepped up their covert operations even as they began to withdraw troops
from the province ahead of the referendum.82
The Clandestina's operations decreased as the more visible Timorese political
organizations began to maneuver towards more open structures. As the proposed date for
the referendum drew closer, the idea of full independence began to gain traction with the
Timorese. Sensing the building international attention, Xanana Gusmio rebranded the
CNRM as the National Council of Timorese Resistance (CNRT). He had decided to drop
the co-opted ethnic slur "Maubere" from the organization's title. With the dissolution of
the CNRM, however, there was no longer any umbrella over the Clandestina. Its
organizational structure maintenance in a more open society.83
Combined with more overt student activity and an increased frequency of
82 "Operasi Sapu Jahad", Bahasa Indonesian for "Operation Clean Sweep"
83 The only documentation I have found so far has been from the Timorese researchers I spoke to and the
research of theirs that I have read. References on the Internet are useless, containing a lot of
contradictions and conflated information. Personal accounts, however, are quite vivid. When I spoke with
members of the National Cooperative Business Association (NCBA), an international NGO, they knew
very little about the Clandestina. When I then spoke with the general manager of the Timor Coffee
Cooperative (CCT), it seemed to be the first time that the NCBA managers were learning how CCT
handled members of the Clandestina working in and amongst the migrant workers of their Dili factory.
(Many of the workers at the Dili plant come from other parts of the country and only live there during the
peak May-September season.) Everything we discussed about the Clandestina was unknown to the
NCBA, and seemed to be known but not generally talked about by the Timorese in the room. Most of my
conversations with village and hamlet chiefs regarding the Clandestina went about in this manner as
well. The younger generation of Timorese I spoke with was even less aware of its existence. I spoke with
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exogenous events that changed Indonesia's hand in its dealings with Timor, the
Clandestina found a less sympathetic and permissive operating environment. Its services
would be needed again after the referendum, however, as it had to deal with a new
problem: local governance of a newly-independent state.
3.2. Bypassing a Disconnect
The events of 1999 unfolded very rapidly. Discussions between Australia, Portugal,
Indonesia and the United Nations regarding the future of the Timor Timur occurred at an
accelerated throughout that year as the economic and political situation in Indonesia went
through upheaval. After the autonomy referendum failed in August, pro-integration militias
initiated a wave of violent acts across the former province. International peacekeeping
forces arrived in September, and the UN put in place a caretaker government before the
end of the year. Despite acknowledging the existence of an indigenous core capacity, the
donors and aid agencies working in Timor proceeded with a clean-slate agenda and
sought to introduce new institutions in all areas of economy, politics and society.84
However, this was not what the existing political powers in Timor had envisioned. The
disconnect between the political parties and resistance fighters pursuing independence on
one hand and the donors and aid agencies working on rebuilding the state on the other
cleared the way for the return of the former shadow government structure. The Frente
84 Volker Boege, Anne Brown, Kevin Clements and Anna Nolan. "On Hybrid Political Orders and Emerging
States: State Formation in the Context of 'Fragility"', Berghof Handbook Dialogue No. 8, Berghof
Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management, October 2008, 11-12
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Clandestina was needed once again.
Initially, all of the large donors and aid agencies that came to Timor worked from
the research done by the World Bank's Joint Assessment Mission (JAM) conducted between
October and November 1999, only a few months after Timor Timur's autonomy
referendum and ensuing violence." According to the Asian Development Bank's (ADB)
Technical Assistance document, the past 24 years of Indonesian occupation had
significantly eroded the traditional system of governance in Timor."8 It believed that there
was effectively no government remaining on the ground. Technical expertise and capacity
had vanished and most of the physical infrastructure in major cities and towns across the
nation had been destroyed. This view was not unique to the ADB, however, it was also
part of the United Nations' baseline characterization. Until as late as 2003, documents
and reports produced by the UN consistently described the nation as completely lacking
in physical and institutional capacity. As recently as last year, the 2008 edition of a justice
systems introduction for UNDP described how brand new institutions had to be built
"from scratch" in Timor.87
How did the international development institutions translate this dire situation into
action? It became justification for a complete rebuilding of all social, political and
economic institutions. Everything needed to be rebuilt "from scratch".88 At the same time,
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86 Asian Development Bank, "Technical Assistance to East Timor for Community Empowerment Program",
February 2000, 2
87 United Nations Development Program, "UNDP Justice System Programme: Induction Guide", May 2008,
25
88 World Bank, "East Timor - Community Empowerment and Local Governance Project, Project Information
Document", 27 December 1999, 4
58
the ADB also believed that the Catholic Church and the National Council for Maubere
Resistance (CNRM), recently rebranded as the National Council of Timorese Resistance
(CNRT), stood alone as the only institutions with a significant level of social capital. As a
result, the ADB and the World Bank created the Technical Assistance program to leverage
that capital in its effort to rebuild a system of governance. The ADB wrote that it saw an
opportunity to put in place a more decentralized and more participatory bottom-up
system, a chance for Timor-Leste to develop a brand new, Western-style, democratic
system of governance." However, the United Nations was planning for a more centralized
governance institutions. But this is not what the CNRT and traditional leaders in the
villages had in mind. For them, a powerful national government was essentially a return to
the Indonesian structure and was incompatible with Timorese society.90
The United Nations relied upon past state-building experiences like that in Kosovo
to inform their institutional recommendations, while the World Bank used past
development projects to inform their solutions to Timor's particular problems. Much of the
World Bank's problem-framing came from their experience with the inadequacies of
Indonesian development and its solutions after the 1997 Asian financial crisis. Before the
crisis and Suharto's subsequent resignation of the presidency, Indonesia was very
centralized. The World Bank had designed a project called the Kecamatan Development
Project (KDP) as a means for the central government to bypass mid-level governments and
directly reach local communities. 91 After the new Indonesian government took office, the
89 Asian Development Bank, 2, 8
90 See Bringing the Outsider In (section 2.1) for a more descriptive discussion on Timorese social structure.
91 "Kecamatan", Bahasa Indonesia for "sub-district"
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state made rapid strides towards decentralization and implemented the KDP. The UN's
proposed governance structure on the other hand was informed more by the pre-crisis
Indonesian regime and by a strong top-down approach to institution building than by the
efforts of the KDP and the post-crisis Indonesian government.
The UN was hard at work creating national-level institutions in Dili, the capital of
independent East Timor. Sergio Vieira de Mello, the head of UNTAET, established the East
Timor Transitional Authority (ETTA) which put Timorese citizens into the civil service
positions that the departing Indonesians had vacated. In November 1999, he established
the National Consultive Council (NCC) with the following numbers of representatives: 92
7 National Council of Timorese Resistance (CNRT)
3 political interest groups outside the CNRT umbrella
3 UN Transitional Administration for East Timor (UNTAET)
1 Catholic Church
1 East Timor Transitional Authority (ETTA)
While this institution contained members of the CNRT, the CNRT was at that time still a
political party and had not yet merged with the former shadow government of the Frente
Clandestina. Some of the chiefs that I spoke with said that the UN was not working
enough with the existing local leadership to design the new government. 93 They felt that
the rapidly emerging government under UNTAET was too centralized and too closely
resembled a scaled-down version of the Indonesian structure that existed before it. They
felt that their voices were not being heard. The UN and the indigenous political powers in
92 Anthony Pecotich and Clifford J. Shultz, II, eds., Handbook of Markets and Economies: East Asia,
Southeast Asia, Australia, New Zealand, (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 2006), 206
93 Cardoso
Timor quickly developed a clash of ideas. 4
As dissatisfaction grew with the direction of governance being pushed by the UN,
the members of the Frente Clandestina that had been active during the Indonesian
occupation began to fill this void.". Many hamlet chiefs had a dual role as a kaixa in the
Clandestina, demonstrating the division between the daytime governance structure that
had worked with the Indonesian government and the nighttime governance structure that
had operated in support of the FALINTIL fighters.9 6 The "blurry line" between their roles
was not unlike the one that Tendler used when describing how actors slip between public
and private roles as governments change hands between parties." Just because the
Clandestina had reduced its profile just before the autonomy referendum, does not mean
its members disappeared. They continued to be active citizens and government officials
taking part in voting and dealing with the issues of independence." When the need arose
for the Clandestina to return and help build the new government, those members crossed
back over the blurry line and resumed their prior roles. Their embeddedness ran both
ways, in society and in governance.
The CNRT needed to strengthen its presence on the ground as it still was only a
political party. It reached out to the Clandestina since the Clandestina had been part of the
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CNRM before. The CNRT quickly absorbed the structure of the Clandestina. Even at the
time of the merger, the Clandestina structure remained much more pervasive in Timor than
UNTAET. 99 As the CNRT grew in size, the UN began to feel threatened by its new far-
reaching influence. The UN saw the CNRT as too exclusionary. The CNRT had unified all
the of various Timorese political parties, but it did not contain the pro-integrationists that
had participated in the Indonesian-sponsored militias. This contentious stance between the
UN and the CNRT would remain this way through the first half of 2000.100 Eventually, the
UN recognized that it had failed to reach outside of the central government based in the
capital city. In July 2000, UNTAET dissolved the NCC and replaced it with the National
Council (NC). This new body included representatives from the 13 districts as well as
various underrepresented groups in an attempt to account for the diverse voices in Timor's
heterogeneous society. ' But, this did not address the grievances of traditional Timorese
leaders.
Unresolved grievances in Timore-Leste sparked confrontation in 2006. Groups that
had been united in their opposition to the Indonesian occupation splintered and led to
new outbreaks of violence in 2006. When I spoke with Timorese about the 2006 unrest,
all of them made clear to me that the divisions exposed had not existed in 2000. There
were some local issues, but being such a heterogeneous society, those divisions did not
preclude other notions of cultural or social identity. Timorese society already had built-in
99 Jarat Chopra, "Building State Failure in East Timor", Development and Change, 3.55 2002: 979-1000,
991
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mechanisms for dealing with exogenous forces. Uma lulik had codified the process of
granting political authority to those coming in with outside knowledge. These grievances
were not with the donors or the aid agencies that were helping the country, but they
pointed to a social dysfunction, something that was not being addressed by the institutions
they were building. The World Bank's CEP provided the chance to address those
grievances, but would get cut short, a casualty of donors' and aid agencies' divergent
agendas.
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4. An Accidental Project
The World Bank's Community Empowerment and Local Governance Project ran from
2000 - 2004. It was the first local governance project and first large-scale project of any
kind after Timor won its independence from Indonesia. Although largely panned as a
failure of development by NGOs, donors and the government of Timor-Leste, the project
was able to make inroads in the rebuilding of local governance that no other project in
Timor-Leste has been able to achieve.
When some attribute the latest wave of problems that began in Timor-Leste in 2006
to corruption and resource curses, they are applying a strictly Western lens to Timor's
development issues. Singling out untraceable money flows or unaccountable politicians as
the primary cause of those issues, as some have written, is short-sighted at best. Generic
arguments about the problems of corruption and the like do little to resolve any of the
fundamental problems that exist in this developing nation. It is more useful to understand
the role of differing agendas amongst aiding agencies and donors, and how chosen
terminology and vague definitions have muddied the developmental language in Timorese
institution building.
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4.7. The CEP Is the Answer
The World Bank and United Nations had each agreed on how to split the responsibilities
of reconstruction, with the UN focusing on security and political matters and the World
Bank dealing with economic issues. The UN agreed to run the country as a mandate under
the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) until it deemed
Timor-Leste capable of running its own affairs. The World Bank partnered with the Asian
Development Bank (ADB) to create the Trust Fund for East Timor, through which grant
money would flow to physical infrastructure projects as well as projects to improve the
healthcare and education systems. This clear jurisdictional distinction between the World
Bank's responsibilities and the United Nations' quickly blurred, however, as the necessity
of simultaneously addressing political and economic issues became unavoidable.
The World Bank believed that traditional society in Timor contained a core capacity
for governance, but it faulted the former Indonesian administration with undermining that
capacity through its relocation and model village programs. Not only had the military
moved citizens from mountain villages down to valley plantations, but the Indonesian
administration had prevented native Timorese from fully participating in government by
making only lower-level government jobs available to them. Indonesian migrants from
other provinces filled the majority of upper-level jobs. The Indonesian government's
transmigration policy reformulated ethnic concentrations throughout Indonesia by
encouraging citizens from Indonesia's ethnic and religious majorities to move into
minority provinces such as Papua and Timor Timur.02 After the autonomy referendum
failed in 1999, most non-Timorese Indonesians fled to the provinces of West Timor and
nearby Bali, hoping for a chance to return when the political climate calmed. When it
became apparent that Timor Timur would instead become fully independent from
Indonesia, most of those civil servants decided not to come back.o0 3 Even with the World
Bank's Joint Assessment Mission (JAM) recommending to the new Timorese government a
60% reduction in the civil service sector from the level of the prior Indonesian
administration, the rapid departure of so many Indonesian civil servants resulted in a
capacity vacuum that the World Bank, the United Nations and others needed to fill as
rapidly as possible.'O4
The World Bank believed that its plan to reform the civil service sector would
achieve three things: create a new, more participatory local governance structure that
could provide the capacity for dealing with economic and political problems at the local
level; relieve the burden on the central government; and meet the JAM's reduction goal.'0s
The World Bank highlighted its own experience in community-driven investment funds,
which it viewed as the most appropriate vehicle for local governance efforts.'0 6 It believed
that past development projects in the southeast Asian region had little impact on
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development, because their lack of local ownership had made citizens dependent on
hand-outs from the central state government. It criticized the top-down management style
of the prior Indonesian administration for retaining information and knowledge in a top-
heavy bureaucracy, thus retarding economic progress at the lower-levels of society. And so
in December 1999, the World Bank launched the first large-scale project in any sector of
development in East Timor, the Community Empowerment and Local Governance Project
(CEP), only four months after the outbreak of violence and only a few months after the
International Force for East Timor (INTERFET) and UNTAET had begun operations in Timor-
Leste.
The project designers looked to promote Timor-Leste's development and
governance by transplanting what they assumed to be a successful intervention in
Indonesia, the Kecamatan Development Project (KDP).1 '7 The World Bank designed the
CEP leveraging many of the same resources they had used to create the KDP. The CEP
documentation claimed that it and the KDP had similar goals and objectives, but made no
explicit comparisons.10 8 By using the KDP as a model for the CEP, the World Bank was
establishing similarities between contemporary Indonesian development and post-violent
conflict redevelopment in Timor-Leste. The KDP had been designed as a social project
rather than an economic one, and as such had been a unique effort for the World Bank.
The emphasis for the KDP had been on transparency and accountability, already popular
ideas for promoters of "good governance" in the international community. The KDP also
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focused on community participation at the local level.1 '0 Similarly, the CEP team regarded
transparency, accountability and participation as paramount to the project's successful
outcome.o President Suharto had championed the KDP in the early stages of design, but
did not participate in its implementation. The CEP designers felt that their project also
needed a major proponent, but without strong support from a national Timorese figure, the
CEP had to rely on the experience and motivation of its own staff, many of whom came
from the KDP team. Fortunately, they soon found national support in the National Council
of Timorese Resistance (CNRT).
The Technical Assistance guidelines published by the ADB stipulated that anyone
working as an international team leader or consultant to the CEP had to have been a
member of the KDP or at least worked with its staff. However, no one had yet done a
comprehensive evaluation of the impacts of that project. That wouldn't begin until at least
2004, four years after the start of the CEP in Timor-Leste."' In reality, the KDP was still very
new, different and only somewhat locally relevant for Timor-Leste. Like the CEP, the KDP
focused on community-level issues and operated in southeast Asia, but the countries these
projects were operating in had different colonial experiences and different cultures. Timor
had a heterogeneity that had developed naturally and was integral to its social tradition of
uma lulik, while Indonesia's heterogeneity had been forced upon it when the Dutch
consolidated a few hundred islands into a single colony. Later, in 2006, the World Bank's
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Working Paper No. 19, World Bank, December 2004
110 World Bank, 10 January 2001, 3
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own critique used the 1997 financial crisis in Indonesia to justify a link between the two
projects, even though this event had occurred while Timor-Leste was still subject to the
development policies of the Indonesian government. 112 This retrospective justification is
largely absent from the discussion in the original project documentation." 3 Furthermore,
considering the low level of development Timor Timur had already experienced as a
restive province of Indonesia, it is doubtful that the 1997 crisis would have had the macro-
level economic impact on East Timor as it did in a more central province like Java.
With the design of the CEP, the World Bank focused on correcting the shortcomings
of other aid agencies' post-violent conflict development projects in other countries. Their
primary criticism was that projects in other post-violent conflict settings had been much to
complex and ambitious to be practically effective." 4 The World Bank felt that a modular
project with a broad scope would be better suited to handling all of the variation that
could arise during implementation. This would facilitate fast flows of financial capital
down to the level of society where it was most needed. The CEP documentation pushed
the need for the early and rapid dispersal of funds and outlined three fundamental policy
goals for the new project:
* to provide a foundation for the new country's structure of local government with a
focus on downward accountability
* to provide a framework for channeling aid into communities with local ownership
112 World Bank, "Timor-Leste: Project Performance Assessment Document", 27 June 2006, 1
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Illustration 6: the structure of the Community Empowerment and Local Governance Project (in gray)
To put the size of the CEP's task in perspective, Timor-Leste had 440 villages and
2336 hamlets as of 1999.116 Its one million citizens were widely dispersed and largely
rural, adding to the challenge of disbursing development resources. The project had a
project management office at the national-level that reported to UNTAET, ETTA and the
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116 ibid, 7
World Bank as well as three tiers of councils: a district-level group of support specialists
who coordinated efforts across their district; a sub-district group, to be elected by citizens
of that sub-district; and a two-person village council, composed of one man and one
woman, who managed the projects in their village (as seen in illustration 6). The World
Bank also assigned technical facilitators to the sub-districts who would be available to
assist villagers with the technical details of their project proposals." 7 Project documents
required that the villages create an interim group to appoint the first village council, but it
does not specify how that interim group was supposed to be created.'" This council
fulfilled the following functions in their village:
* preparing and implementing village development plans
* producing codes of conduct and resolving disputes
* managing village funds
* relaying development priorities to the sub-district and district level administrators
* strengthening participation and democratic practices
Once the village had elected its two council members, the sub-district facilitator would
immediately allocate a block grant of $15,000 to that village to fund their first round of
development projects. The World Bank rapidly replicated this simple structure across all
13 districts and 440 villages in the country.120
When the World Bank renewed the financing for the second year of the CEP, the
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project designers removed the dispute resolution mechanism, but left in place all of the
development and governance requirements. They had some concern that having the
village councils involved in conflict resolution would take away from the social cohesion
aspects of this project. 21' This is an interesting departure from the KDP whose main
strength came from its conflict resolution mechanisms.' 22 However, it is also a sign that the
World Bank was sensitive to the local context and was willing to quickly address and
correct aspects of the project that may not have been working.
The CNRT was the World Bank's ear to the ground, providing it with the sensitivity
needed to adapt project design and execution to changing conditions. UNTAET, on the
other hand, chose a separate path to pursue its governance-building agenda and started its
own governance project at the district level in 2000.123 The UN was focusing its efforts at a
higher level of government than the World Bank and the CNRT who worked a the village
level. Nevertheless, the World Bank and the CNRT had convinced UNTAET that it needed
to work with the CEP to realize Timor-Leste's development goals. However, with so many
resources dedicated to the build-up of district administrations, UNTAET could not find
sufficient manpower to support the CEP.124 In addition, UNTAET had reservations about the
CNRT's involvement in the project. Its reluctance came from its negative impression of the
CNRT, whom it continued to regard as a monopolistic political party that had crowded out
121 World Bank, "Project Appraisal Document for the Proposed Trust Fund Grand in the Amount of US$1.5
Million to East Timor for a Third Community Empowerment and Local Governance Project", 3 June
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competing voices.125 The CNRT saw itself, however, as a proto-government institution,
organizing local leaders at the grass-roots level who continued to mistrust the UN and its
district-level advisors. 12 6
In the project's second-year funding documentation, the World Bank described its
expertise and unique ability for cutting through the obstacles of bureaucracy. It saw the
growing bureaucracy of the United Nations-led government as further justification for the
continuation of the CEP.127 The evolving, complex institutional structures that were
emerging from the three-year formation of Timor-Leste's government were, to the World
Bank, beginning to resemble some of the same challenges that it had sought to address
previously with the KDP in Indonesia. The World Bank in 1997 had worked with President
Suharto of Indonesia to create a mechanism by which it could bypass the corrupt mid-
level governments of his sprawling and populous nation. 128
When communication problems began to inhibit the working relationship between the
CEP project team and the district administrators of UNTAET, UNTAET argued that it should
have been included more in the CEP's design process.' 29 Ultimately, when it came time to
have the first set of elections for village councils, UNTAET pushed the process through as
rapidly as possible and with minimal support. '30 It's initially low level of enthusiasm for
the project continued to decline.
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With the donors and aid agencies working different agendas in overlapping areas of
responsibility, it is hard to imagine how the CEP could have had any successful outcomes.
Both agencies worked from the same set of assumptions, informed by the JAM, but
reached different conclusions about how to achieve those goals. The CEP provided the
opportunity to address the grievances of the traditional leadership and their desire to take
part in the new government.
4.2. Success inside Failure
Only three years into the project, NGOs, the United Nations and the national government
of Timor-Leste generally agreed that the World Bank's effort in Timor-Leste had been a
failure. The Community Empowerment and Local Governance Project (CEP) had not
established the foundation for a new structure of local government. The World Bank in its
own after-action report owned up to many of the mistakes it had made. 13' While it created
the mechanism for early and rapid disbursement of development funds, this funding
vehicle disappeared after the project dissolved in 2004. With poor inter-agency
communication and a difficult working relationship with the UN, the CEP also did not
facilitate the transition from UN-sponsored government to the independent republic that
emerged in 2002. The village councils that exist today are only tangentially related to
those councils of the CEP. Despite all of this, there were elements of the CEP that showed
significant promise for the strong local governance that continues to elude Timor-Leste.
131 World Bank, 27 June 2006
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In only a few months, the CEP achieved a level of outreach that no prior
administration had achieved in over 450 years. The Portuguese had rarely traveled beyond
the coastal areas, and the Indonesians had to relocate villagers in order to reach them. The
CEP, like the Kecamatan Development Project (KDP) of Indonesia, bypassed the mid-level
bureaucratic structures of the government by design. The CEP reached citizens before
anyone from the newly-forming central government in Timor-Leste had made a visit to the
villages.
The MoPF wrote in 2004 that people were very happy to see aid money going
directly from the CEP into the communities. 13 2 Under the Indonesian administration most
development aid would wind through the bureaucracy and stop short of reaching the
villages. Village chiefs I spoke with told me of their positive experiences with the CEP.
During our conversations, I was given lists of achievements made with these funds. In
Lalini, one chief told me that his village of 1500 had built 106 houses with the support of
funding from from the World Bank."33 A chief from Suku Lorba, on the opposite side of the
country, credited the CEP with school rehabilitation and construction of water and
irrigation systems in his village. He explained to me that the difference between this
project and others he had been involved with was that the project management team was
genuinely happy to have the village involved in the project planning process. He summed
up the experience by saying that the desire to help flowed both ways, from the project
team to the villagers and from the villagers to the project team. 134
132 ibid, 31
133 Laurantino, personal interview, 9 August 2008
134 Silvano Cardoso, personal interview, 29 January 2009
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However there were also some issues with the project. Those that participated in
the project at the village council level as well as those that advised the project at the sub-
district and district levels felt that the project suffered from inflexibility. The MoPF report
credited the CEP with construction of 235 community centers, covering just over half the
villages in Timor over the course of a few years, but argued that the money might have
been better spent on schools and roads. They also criticized rules that limited the authority
to makes changes to the core project management team. 13" Evans has written that projects
with limited choice are really quite common.'36 Many success stories of participation and
empowerment actually involve processes where project designers put strict limits on
participants' choices. The KDP had similarly restricted villages' project selections to non-
social infrastructure projects.'37 Villagers drafting project proposals for the CEP were only
allowed to choose from a menu of basic infrastructure needs: they could choose to build
community centers, schools and clinics; repair homes, roads and bridges; work on
electrical, water supply, sanitation and irrigation projects; or create credit organizations."3
The CEP's technical advisors limited the pool of projects from which villagers could draft
proposals in order to focus villagers' decisions on a few pre-determined outcomes. This
was easier to support technically because it limited the amount of expertise that the World
Bank needed to budget for, freeing up more funds for the villages themselves. From a
Western freedom-of-choice perspective it seems unfair to have such limitations, but more
135 Ministry of Planning and Finance, 14-21
136 Peter Evans, "Development as Institutional Change: The Pitfalls of Monocropping and the Potentials of
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importantly, it also did not mesh well with the fundamental Timorese sociological model.
Timorese decision-making has historically been done through consensus-building within
the ancestral-ritual-political hierarchy of uma lulik. Projects in Timor-Leste that did not
subscribe to this conceptual framework were accepted with less legitimacy than their
peers. This caused problems for the CEP in its early stages. The World Bank's alliance with
the CNRT kept the project from failing outright.
The scale of the CEP also seemed to outpace the project's own capacity. Villages
lacked the technical expertise for executing infrastructure projects. If the facilitator
assigned by the project to help them needed more capacity, she was supposed to be able
to call upon additional assistance from the district level. However, technical capacity at
the district level also was weak."' UNTAET and the new governmental bodies had agreed
to many coordination and deconfliction steps, but partly due to the rapid pace and partly
due to the World Bank's own capacity issues, much of that communication went
undone.1 40 In the end, however, the CEP could claim to have quickly mobilized a large
number of citizens country-wide, helping engage them in constructive community work at
a formative stage in the country's rebirth.1 41
Besides building new physical infrastructure, the project also had some less
tangible benefits. The skills that village council-members learned were central to the civil
service capacity-building goal of the international development bodies in Timor-Leste.
Experience in project management, group facilitation and governance issues was
139 World Bank, 3 June 2002, 16
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important if the country was going to successfully fill the vacuum in civil service capacity
created by the hasty departure of the Indonesian bureaucracy.142 Success in this area is not
as clear as in the case for infrastructure and maintenance, but this was a function more of
rules imposed on the formation of the national government as opposed to the stipulations
of the CEP itself. Thrusting inexperienced villagers into elections and then expecting them
to perform well resulted in high turnover rates, but the lower number of high-level civil
service jobs, resulting from the national government's implementation of the Joint
Assessment Mission's recommendations, meant that the promotion pyramid for civil
service was much steeper.143 The few slots available were quickly being filled; the vacuum
that many feared would exist after the Indonesians left did not last for very long.
The village councilors regarded themselves merely as project team members, rather
than as part of the actual structure of local governance. They saw their roles as guides in
the CEP process, not as true decision-makers. Largely through informal relationships, the
traditional leadership itself was making the decisions.144 This was a view shared by village
chiefs I spoke with in Suku Ahaik and Suku Lalini, both in the Vikeke district. 145 A follow-
up report by the MoPF placed the rate of direct selection of village council members by
traditional leaders at 30%.146 Where the World Bank had thought it important to respect,
but not include the elders of the village in the project, they had made a fundamental
miscalculation.
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Advertisement and implementation of the project came from the CNRT. It had
advised the World Bank that the traditional leadership and political parties should be
excluded from participating in the village council elections for at least the first three years
of the project. It believed that because the chiefs had been an integral part of the pre-
independence power dynamic, they would have too much influence on the creation of a
new local power structure.147 In reality, the traditional leadership was heavily involved, as
many were part of the Frente Clandestina which merged with the CNRT in 2000. As it
turned out, attempting to prevent their involvement was not realistic. Past experiences in
Timor-Leste have shown that attempts to shift the power dynamic happen at a relatively
slow pace, if they occur at all.
As the one project that created the opportunity for traditional society to enter the
new local governance structure, the World Bank's CEP found itself in similar quandary as
the Portuguese with the existing paradigm and the one that it hoped to establish through
the new village councils. No other development project confronted this issue at the time.
The World Bank's relationship with the CNRT was likely a preferred method to link with
traditional leadership rather than intermarriage and blood-oaths. The Ministry of Planning
of Finance (MoPF) criticized the World Bank for building community centers as mere
solidarity building exercises, but when looked at with the understanding of uma lulik, this
was a poorly executed but valid attempt to move into the center and gain legitimacy with
Timorese people.148
147 World Bank, 9 May 2005, 3-4
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The World Bank had begun to recognize its mistake in downplaying the role of
traditional leaders by the second round of funding for the CEP. 149 In the project documents,
they added a new component to the project, called "cultural heritage".15 o The CEP
framework provided for preservation of oral history, creation of a national cultural center
and block grants for small-scale history and cultural centers in the villages. This insight
showed a similarity in the thinking of the 1930s Portuguese and the 2000s World Bank
project managers, that legitimacy can be achieved by linking new ideas from the outside
to the sacred inner circle of uma lulik. No other development project in Timor-Leste had
made this important connection. This was the same thinking that gave the Church its first
bit of legitimacy in Timor and the same thinking that prevented acceptance of the
Indonesian administration.
The World Bank lost its project champion early on in the life of the project. In June
2001, Xanana Gusmio, head of the CNRT, dissolved the CNRT umbrella in order to allow
members to participate and compete individually in Timor-Leste's first multi-party
democratic elections. Many members, however, did not understand this sudden
announcement. The dissolution meant that former members of the CNRT, previously
united by the umbrella organization, were now on opposing sides in the elections."' The
149 In the Agricultural Rehabilitation Project (ARP), the World Bank also prohibited village leaders from
playing an important role in project implementation and operation. Similar problems of legitimacy and
loss of interface between old and new power-holders emerged after the CNRT dissolved, but in this case
the World Bank quickly reevaluated its policies. It reversed the rules regarding traditional leadership
participation and brought them into the decision-making process of the second ARP. The second CEP was
not similarly modified, but the World Bank acknowledged that the lack of inclusion represented a future
project sustainability issue. See World Bank, 27 June 2006, 42; World Bank, 3 June 2002, 23
150 World Bank, 10 January 2001, 8
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mass confusion worked to favor the FRETILIN, who had recently regrouped as a political
party, and emerged as the dominant political force after the August 2001 elections. 15 2 They
were aligned with the more centralized governance vision of the UN. With a majority in
the new National Assembly, they also had the power to pursue and maintain that
centralized system of governance. Because the CNRT had been vital to the socialization of
the project, support for the CEP immediately began to erode with the CNRT's dissolution
and the FRETILIN's consolidation of power. The CNRT had been the conduit through
which the World Bank's new village councils and the traditional leadership engaged each
other, but that link had now disappeared. That was as close as the village chiefs came to
becoming true members of the new Timor-Leste government. Despite having a voice
through the CNRT, the traditional leadership's lack of direct inclusion in the original
project design had indicated to villagers that these new councils would only be temporary
and therefore outside the traditional authority paradigm.'53 As a result, the traditional
leadership had more political power remaining than the CNRT or the World bank had
anticipated, but no means with which to execute that power on a national scale. In
addition, neither the World Bank nor the CNRT had any of the ritual authority granted by
uma lulik that would have allowed them to make credible changes to the political
landscape.
By the third round of CEP funding in 2002, the project documentation contained a
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statement expressing the belief that traditional leadership was vital to the success of CEP
and development in general, but it did not make any recommendation other than to have
further discussion on the matter.'54 Despite initial project claims that traditional society
contained the core capacity needed to rebuild society and local governance, concerns that
inclusion of the traditional leadership itself would undermine attempts to create this new
democratic system had prevailed over hopes for their participation. It took a few years too
long to reverse course on this mistake.'55
The loss of the project's powerful champion, the CNRT, may have helped seal the
project's fate, yet this was the only project in Timor-Leste that had made any link to
traditional leadership. My discussions with village chiefs from across the country praised
the work of the World Bank in their villages. If there had there been no CEP, no
coordinated local governance project would have existed below the district level until
2006 when the UN launched its own local governance project. Without CEP, no
mechanism existed by which funds could have been distributed to villages for their own
reconstruction projects. Had the project been more sustainable from the outset, the merits
of the methodology taking shape by the third round of funding might have become more
obvious. Lack of UN support, project design issues and purposeful exclusion of traditional
leaders had already begun to erode its effectiveness of the CEP before serious
consideration had been given to this sustainability deficiency.'5 6 Many projects in Timor-
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Leste at the time had made mistakes, but no other had made any connection with the
existing local leadership for the purposes of bringing them into the governance structure.
As Locke said, in order to build strong institutions, we must consider institutions
that build trust. 7"' The same is true in Timor-Leste. The CEP did not achieve that goal, but it
offered great promise as it worked through its design issues. By the third round of funding
for the CEP, the project documentation showed clear signs that it was heading towards
enabling consensus-building mechanisms. This would have allowed the village councils to
encapsulate the self-interest of the villagers. What Tsai called encompassing and
embedding institutions would have guaranteed that even without complex designs and a
resource-heavy push towards a Western-style democratic system, Timor-Leste could have
achieved responsible self-governance.'5 8
4.3. Local Reality
Critics both within and outside the country alternatingly attributed the violent outbreaks of
2006 to a broken disarmament process, an opaque media and a failed land titling regime.
Violence in 2007 was blamed on developmental inequities. Finally, assassination attempts
in 2008 were regarded as a failure of post-violent conflict reconciliation.'5 9 Each donor
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and aid agency that came to East Timor in 1999 brought their own institutional
prescription for post-violent conflict reconstruction. A review of other post-violent conflict
situations and their subsequent traditional-state government relationships has shown how
prescriptions produce dissimilar results in different locales.'6 ' Even the World Bank's
decision to use the two-year old KDP as a model for CEP reflects this thinking: that a
correct institution for building local governance in southeast Asia had been discovered
and should be applied to the situation in Timor-Leste.
More than a few researchers in recent years have talked about how there really are
no proper prescriptions for a country's institutions. The Catholic Church gained relevancy
once it became seriously involved in the local educational system. Membership really
took off when native Timorese started leading the Church in their own diocese, leveraging
the Church's political and social capital in areas of Timorese concern. This was a gradual
evolution of an indigenously-managed institution with support from the outside. Chand
and Coffman talked about the need to create and root institutions, not copy and paste
them into a new government.'6 ' In a recent paper, Rodrik illustrated a few cases where
institutions that had just enough competence and just enough capacity functioned well
160 For further reading on post-violent conflict state-building see: Volker Boege, Anne Brown, Kevin
Clements and Anna Nolan. "On Hybrid Political Orders and Emerging States: State Formation in the
Context of 'Fragility'", Berghof Handbook Dialogue No. 8, Berghof Research Center for Constructive
Conflict Management, October 2008; Paul Richards, Khadija Bah and James Vincent, "Social Capital and
Survival: Prospects for Community-Driven Development in Post-Conflict Sierra-Leone", Social
Development Papers, Paper No. 12, World Bank, April 2004; Daniel Esser, "The City as Hub and Prey:
Patterns of Violence in Kabul and Karachi", Environment and Urbanization, 16.2 1 October 2004: 31-38;
Regine Andersen, "How Multilateral Development Assistance Triggered the Conflict in Rwanda", Third
World Quarterly, 21.3 2000: 441-456; Janine Aron, "Building Institutions in Post-Conflict African
Economies", Journal of International Development 15 2003: 471-485
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enough to solve their nation's particular issues. 162 In addition, they were much less
resource intensive then the transplanted alternative. In another paper, Locke pointed out
the fallacy in the search for right and wrong solutions. He proposed instead to look to
build trust sequentially from indigenous social and governmental strong points.' 3' With all
of the institutional breakdowns in Timor-Leste in 2006, it has become clear that the rapid
transplanted approach there has caused some problems.
Many people in Timor-Leste that I spoke with me told me that the fighting between
the Lorosa'e vs. Loromonu in 2006 was really an artificial division within Timorese society
that had not been an antagonistic relationship before independence. 164 The push for
liberalization and democratization, has at times led to increased violence and insecurity.165
The rapid introduction of new institutions has the potential to disrupt society and cause
more problems than existed prior. Stiglitz was writing against the idea of "shock therapy"
just as donors and aid agencies were beginning to push the "blank slate" in Timor-Leste.' 66
The rapid privatization of public goods provisioning and the misapplication of economic
policies brought the rebirth of post-Soviet Russia to a grinding halt. In countries emerging
from violent conflict, the quick loss of patronage networks and the high cost of
disarmament, demobilization and reintegration has torn governments and societies
apart.' 67
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Considering the large expenditure of resources that state-building requires, it is
useful to discuss the appropriate end result of that aid. La'o Hamutuk, a Timorese NGO
that monitors aid agencies in their country, estimated that as of 2006, donors had spent a
combined total of $4 billion in Timor-Leste.'6 8 This is approximately $4,000 for every man,
woman and child and ten times per capita GDP.'6 9 Aid flows today continue to be
relatively substantial. A team of researchers using a simple definition of state sovereignty
recently reexamined the question of resources and goals in Timor-Leste. They believed that
a sovereign state was one that could fully fund its recurrent budget exclusively from
internal revenue sources. By their estimation, it would take Timor-Leste 27 years to meet
that requirement. With unconditional aid that doesn't mandate specific models of
governance or economy, Timor-Leste would require international aid and protection until
at least 2026. Additional requirements would only extend that date out further.1 70
Timor-Leste is a society that is naturally receptive to outside ideas. Unfortunately,
this seems to have worked to their disadvantage, making it too easy to import
inappropriate ideas. Introducing institutions that are poorly understood by the Timorese
themselves has done the country a disservice."1 7 The traditional method of decision-
making in Timor-Leste is by consensus. However, those advising Timor-Leste's institution-
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forming process regarded a consensus-building approach to decision-making as
undemocratic and therefore not an acceptable solution. 7 2
Artificial language has also been a problem. Groups that work in Timor-Leste
continue to rely on insufficiently-clear definitions in their work with the Timorese. I spoke
with two village chiefs in the Vikeke sub-district of Lacluta on the matter of elections and
democracy.7 3 One said he was democratically elected in 2005 and the other said he was
elected in 1999. The first chief told me that he was serving a 4-year term, while the second
one said he had been chief for nine years and wasn't sure the end date of his term. Current
Timor-Leste law stipulates that since 2005, elections for village chiefs must occur every
four years.7 4 After I spoke with chiefs in some other districts, I began to understand that
the term "democracy" for some meant simply the ability to have multiple political parties.
They also associated democracy with conflict and the manipulation of power by the elites
of the national government. 75' There was almost a universal opinion that "democracy"
should instead refer to "dignity". Respect for other people in their villages as well as self-
respect, they believed, were the embodiments of a true Timorese democracy.17 6 If a
handful of interviews resulted in such a range of answers, it is conceivable that a wide
variation exists in the understanding what a democratic, Timorese institution should look
like.'77
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Traditional leaders and culture continue to have the respect of many Timorese
citizens, but the central government's current village-level governance efforts exclude the
traditional leadership from modern governmental affairs. The Head of Administration and
Finance at the National Directorate for Suco Administration (DNAAS) that I spoke with is
pushing for the new "daily government representative" to take a larger role in day-to-day
village affairs at the expense of both the village councils and the village chiefs. He cited a
local level glut of ready and willing civil servants: there are many more educated youth in
the villages than there are civil service jobs in the government.17 8 This, of course, is the
same problem that the Community Empowerment and Local Governance Project (CEP)
found in the early 2000s. His strategy is to employ some of them as government "daily
representatives" that could assist village counselors with their regular duties. Village
councils only meet once per month, whereas the daily representatives would work every
day. In addition, current village council-members' duties are secondary to their other work
as teachers, farmers, etc. Today, the Timor-Leste government views village chiefs as
volunteer leaders, and as such does not offer them compensation."' 9 The daily
representatives, on the hand, will be paid by the central government. After the next set of
village council elections in 2009, he plans to expand his pilot program of government
representatives in the villages from one to two people, as many as are on the councils they
respondents questions about the current state of political and social affairs in the country. The survey used
terms such as "democracy", "corruption", "women's rights", but failed to provide a methodology or a
definition of those terms in the results. It is hard to discern whether the ideas that the surveyors were
asking about were the same as the ones respondents provided answers to. ; international Republican
Institute, "Timor-Leste National Survey Results, November 10 - December 16, 2008", 2008
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are advising. In Timor-Leste the traditional leadership has yet to be included in any
meaningful responsibilities of governance. It remains to be seen whether DNAAS's new
centralization strategy will be successful.
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5. Conclusion
Post-violent conflict rebuilding is now a large part of the work of donors and other
international agencies, but the failures and successes are not as clear cut and dichotomous
as much of the literature claims. The Republic of Kosovo is formally recognized by less
than a third of the world's countries, yet is considered by many a "success" born from the
ashes of conflict. Haiti has had a string of coups and rebellions over the last 15 years, and
yet this "failure" continues to have popular elections with high turnouts. Timor-Leste, with
all of its institutions rebuilt "from scratch" by the international community, had outbreaks
of extremely disruptive violent conflict in 2006, displacing 10% of the national
population, and was further traumatized by assassination attempts on the president and
prime minister in 2008. Clearly, the popular verdicts are much too simplistic to describe
what is going on in these countries.
I wanted to understand the nuances of post-violent conflict development better
myself, so I chose to examine the World Bank's Community Empowerment and Local
Governance Project (CEP), the first local governance project conducted in Timor-Leste after
the declaration of independence. Although donors including the World Bank, NGOs and
the government of Timor-Leste itself have regarded the project as a failure, I actually found
a less clear-cut judgement after looking at project documents, talking to people familiar
with the project, and then couching that in a historical understanding of how Timorese
have dealt with previous interventions from the outside. Through the World Bank and its
project champion, the National Council of Timorese Resistance (CNRT), the project
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brought the existing, traditional local political structure closer to having a hand in
governing in their new nation than any other project before or since.
I also found a very interesting story in that of the Frente Clandestina resistance
movement, on which the CNRT based its proto-government. This was an organization that
defied much of the literature I read on social capital and violent conflict with their
emphasis on thick interactions within groups and adversity-resistant inter-group
relationships. With its loose coalition of resistance fighters, civilians and lower-level local
government officials, the Clandestina is more fittingly described as an informal governance
institution that functioned in the shadows of the Indonesian administration. Trust-less
relations between members allowed the Clandestina to survive the forces of military
occupation. An institution inherently built on distrust, rather than trust is not yet a popular
or well-understand idea in the development literature, although it has begun to appear in
the political science, sociological and entrepreneurship literature in the work of Tsai, Levi
and Locke, amongst others. The possibility that trust may not be the starting point for
institution building is not yet acceptable.
Inter-organizational politics and conflicting agendas from donors and aid agencies
working in Timor-Leste got in the way of successful implementation of governance
projects. Misuse of terminology and poor communication also caused confusion amongst
donors and those receiving assistance. Ideas about democracy and local governance,
familiar to Western-trained advisors were different and in some cases in conflict with those
of the people they were aiding. Initially, the CEP made those same mistakes, but by the
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third round of funding for the project, it explicitly recognized that gap and made
recommendations for resolution of those inconsistencies. Of the large-scale projects in
Timor-Leste, the CEP had the greatest potential for realizing a synthesis of traditional and
donor ideas, but had lost its base of support in the new government by the time it was
ready to move in that direction.
Even though all of the donors and aid agencies claimed that Timor-Leste would be
a model for future state-building efforts because it was rebuilt "from scratch", they now
consider that framing inadvisable. Their disagreement on how to fulfill a reconstruction
agenda, however, has not been resolved. Timor-Leste has endured some severe wounds in
its development process since the international community made rosier predictions 10
years ago, but there is still much value in learning from its development experience. As a
local governance project, the CEP shows us that international institutions do not have to
shy away from the core components of a society because of perceived sensitivity issues.
Traditional, ritual and political factors need to be integrated into development projects free
from the fear of problems with favoritism or legitimacy. This runs counter Western
democratic ideas of equality, but it runs in line with Timorese democratic ideas of dignity
and respect. Until all of the actors agree that they are building a Timorese institution in a
Timorese society, Timor-Leste's survival as a dignified and respected nation will continue
to be an uphill struggle.
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7. Appendix
7.1. A Brief 450 Year History
Padroado Real
K.M. Panikkar described the period from 1498 through 1945 as the Vasco da Gama
epoch.'8 0 For nearly 450 years, most of the commerce conducted between nations was
done by Portuguese or by groups in direct opposition to their dominance of the
international trade. The King of Gujarat in the early 16 th Century, Sultan Bahadur Shah is
reportedly said to have declared that "wars by sea are merchant affairs", which helps
explain why the Portuguese were able to so quickly build their Estado da India. Before the
arrival of the Portuguese in Asia, Indian Ocean trade was dominated by Gujarati traders
who set up small trading outposts both in continental South Asia and on the many
neighboring islands. In 1509, 11 years after Vasco da Gama had set foot in India, Admiral
Alfonso de Albuquerque destroyed the combined fleets of Egypt and Gujarat. One year
later the Admiral claimed Goa for the Portuguese. With that, Portugal now controlled the
central port of trade in South Asia. On the eastern end of South Asia's trade routes was the
port city of Malacca. It was from here that various commodities of the islands made their
way up to the lucrative Chinese market. This port fell to Admiral Albuquerque in 1511.
The Portuguese took its western counterpart, the port city of Ormuz, controlled by Shah
180 K.M. Panikkar, Asia and Western Dominance. (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1953)
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Ismail I, founder of the Safavid dynasty of Iran, in 1515.18'
Aside from royal ambivalence, a few other factors contributed to Portugal's rapid
conquest of Asian seaborne trade. China was the region's the lead regional power. In the
15th Century, Admiral Zhenghe's massive fleet of ships had already traveled to Malacca,
India, Persia, Arabia and Africa. However, staring in 1549, the Ming emperor forbade
international trade and exploration, most likely because of extensive and costly pirating by
Japanese. 182 Despite this, virtually all merchant ships in the waters south of Asia remained
unarmed, as even Admiral Zhenghe's had been. Japan itself retreated from international
trade as it became more and more consumed by internal feudal struggles, before being
finally unified by Toyotomi Hideyohsi in 1598 and centralized by Tokugawa leyasu in the
mid-i 7th Century. 18 China and Japan's retreat from international trade would also allow
Portugal to expand into Macao and Nagasaki in the late 16 th Century, but their temporary
isolationism made it easier for the Portuguese to build out the rest of their trade network.
Through control of international trade and cultural discourse, the Gujarati traders
had spread the Islamic faith throughout South and Southeast Asia. The Portuguese
attempted to spread the Christian faith similarly with their acquired trading ports and
newly established outposts. Two factors contributed to this development. Christian
missions that had begun in the 13 th Century depended on the Silk Road for travel between
Europe and Asia. As the Islamic empires of Central Asia expanded, this overland route was
181 C.R. Boxer, The Portuguese Seaborne Empire 1415-1825, (London: Hutchinson & Co.,1969), 39-46
182 Equally important factors for this retreat include defense of the empire from ever-strengthening attacks
by Mongols and the Manchu. Boxer, 43-44
183 Ernst Van Veen and Leonard Bluss6, eds., Rivalry and Conflict: European Traders and Asian Trading
Networks in the 16 th and 17 h Centuries. Studies in Overseas History #7, (Leiden: CNWS, 2005), 15-16
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cut off, so by the early 1500's these missions had ceased to function. 184 At the same time,
the Roman Catholic church was going through some soul-searching. In the early 16th
Century, the Portuguese began an Inquisition, similar but longer than the Spanish one
before it. Pope Paul Ill initiated the Council of Trent in 1545 which sought to return the
Church to its orthodox roots. In Portugal, the Ecclesiastical Council of 1 567 decreed that
only orthodox Roman Catholicism should exist; that the Crown of Portugal had a duty to
spread the Roman Catholic faith; and that the conversion of subjects should be done
without force. This is when the padroado real (union of Church and Crown) that had been
established at the turn of the Century began to gather strength. Padroado real would
remain the guiding light for maintaining territorial claims well into the 2 0 th Century.
185
Portuguese Timor
Timor is one of the islands in the Lesser Sundra at the southern boundary of
Indonesia's chain of islands. Its climate is uniquely conducive to the growth of
sandalwood trees. An extremely important commodity in trade with China, it is prized for
its use in furniture-making. After securing Malacca, the Portuguese took over trade of this
lucrative Timor export.186 They enforced their monopoly with a fort built in 1553 on the the
neighboring island of Solor. The first challengers to the Portugal's dominance of trade in
the region came when the Dutch launched a campaign from the east in the Moluccas.
184 Van Veen, 71
185 Boxer, 67-68
186 Trade in tortoise shell and beeswax was also very important to the Timorese export economy to China,
and were similarly taken over by the Portuguese. Besides these, the Chinese also wanted Portuguese
silver, which was always needed for imperial coinage. Van Veen, 220
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They first conquered Tidore in 1605 and then took Solor from the Portuguese in 1613,
exiling them to Larantuka, Flores, an island about 10km away. Successive Dutch
commanders of the fort acted increasingly independent of the Dutch crown and
abandoned the Solor fort in 1629. Jan de Hornay joined the exiled and isolated Zwarte
Portugeesen (black Portuguese) community, now referring to themselves as Larantouqeiros
meaning "from Larantuka", across the water. Having lost local control, the Dutch
authorities operating out of Batavia (Jakarta) began to conduct their trade from ships, but
because they were only intermittently present, they were no match for the De Hornay
family's rapidly rising power. Jan de Hornay's descendent, Antonio, then acting as
middleman between the Portuguese operating out of Macassar and the local rajas on
Timor, moved his operations to Lifao, in Timor itself. Even a Dutch return to Solor in 1653
and an invasion by the Dutch army out of the Moluccas in 1 656 could not unseat
Antonio's increasingly oppressive mini-empire on the eastern half of Timor. Francisco
Vieira de Figueiredo, a leading Portuguese merchant from Macassar appointed Antonio de
Hornay as Capitio-Mor (Captain-Major) of Timor in 1663. When Macassar itself fell to the
Dutch in 1 667, De Hornay further consolidated his power by giving refuge to Vieira de
Figueiredo. The closest Portuguese authority, then in Goa, sent their own man to be
Capitao-Mor in 1683 but he quickly fled. It wasn't until after De Hornay's death in 1694
that Portugal regained formal control of eastern Timor, naming it Portuguese Timor in 1702.
The land boundary with the Dutch-controlled portion of Timor roughly stood at the
present-day boundary between the Indonesian state of East Nusa Tenggara and the nation
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of Timor-Leste."8 7
By 1699, Lifao, Timor had become the center of the Lesser Sundra islands, and
while most of the town's inhabitants spoke Portuguese, only a handful appeared to be of
European descent. Even after the Portuguese regained control the small Portuguese
representation on Timor, the partitido real (royalists), maintained their power by playing
different tribes against one another throughout the 1700s and 1800s.'88 By colonial
standards, the Portuguese authority appears to have been relatively progressive. Although
this may be due to the geographical practicalities of the country, the traditional structure of
authority remained largely unchanged from before the Portuguese arrival in the 1550s
until the Indonesian occupation 425 years later.
Efforts to Christianize the local population of Portuguese Timor were marginally
successful. Consequently, despite a long period of secular rule, the government passed the
Organic Statue of Portuguese Catholic Missions in 1926, effectively delegitimizing all non-
Catholic missions overseas. The Concordant of 1940 and the Missionary Agreement of
1940 both brought the support of the Vatican to this effort. Portuguese Timor became its
own diocese of the Catholic Church that same year. Even though the number of Catholics
in Portuguese Timor still only numbered about 66,000 out of a 1950 population of
approximately 500,000, the Church had a major role in expanding primary and secondary
education.18 9 This ultimately paid off for the Church which had membership numbers in
187 Van Veen, 222-227
188 Boxer, 143-146
189 A.H. de Oliveira Marques, History of Portugal, Volume II1: From Empire to Corporate State, (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1972), 253-256
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excess of 90% by the turn of the 21 s Century.
Portugal tried to remain neutral in the Southeast Asian diplomatic battleground that
precluded World War II. In 1937, it attempted to placate Japanese desires for access to
Timor by establishing the joint Sociedade Agricol Patria e Trabalho with Japan. This Dili-
based organization immediately controlled 25% of the coffee, rubber and cacao export
industries and 37% of the imports of Portuguese Timor. In October of 1940, Japan
extended its first international air route of Yokohoma-Saipan-Palau into Dili. After this air
travel arrangement was formalized in October of 1941, Dutch Timor reacted with a gas
embargo of Portuguese Timor. The U.K., Australia and the Netherlands all sent troops to
Dili to which the Japanese responded with an attack in February of 1942.190 The three
nations' troops retreated to the hills, but along with Portuguese Timorese nationals and
Australian air support, fighting continued until Japan acquiesced in 1945, leaving
thousands of Timorese dead both from fighting or their treatment in Japanese
concentration camps. 191 Portugal's governor-general remained on station throughout the
War so as to maintain the pre-war power arrangement with Japan.
East Timor
Prior to World War II, Portugal's Estado Novo (New State) had primarily focused on
the economic development of its two large African colonies, Angola and Mozambique.
After the War, Portugal made an effort to create a common market amongst all of the
190 Ken'ichi Goto Tensions of Empire: lapan and Southeast Asia in the Colonial & Postcolonial World
(Singapore: Singapore University Press, 2003), 27-35
191 De Oliveira Marques, 234
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colonies, but it did not have the power of enforcement. Finally, with the Carnation
Revolution and the support of the military, the Estado Novo was overthrown in 1974.192 A
combination of independence movements in Portugal's colonies as well as a decreased
interest from the Third Republic of Portugal for managing imperial possessions led to its
abandonment of Portuguese Timor that same year. Many people had an affinity for the
relatively progressive regime and in fact felt abandoned by Portugal's hasty exit.'93
Indonesian military intelligence reacted to calls for establishing a republic in EastTimor
with Operasi Komodo, a plan to subvert the pro-independence movements. An attempted
coup in August of 1975 by pro-Indonesian militias inside East Timor wound up setting off a
civil war. The Frente Revolucionaria de Timor-Leste Independente (FRETILIN), a populist
Catholic independence movement, declared victory over its partner-turned-adversary the
Unido Democratica Timorense (UDT), a more conservative pro-Portugal and pro-Indonesia
movement, on November 28, 1975. A week later, Indonesia invaded the country citing the
Balibo Declaration to reunite Indonesia and a need to prevent the emergence of another
Communist state in Southeast Asia.194 As early as 1979, 200,000 Timorese were reported to
have perished resisting the occupation.
Given that American President Gerald Ford and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger
had visited Indonesia's leadership the day before the Indonesian invasion of East Timor, it
has been widely speculated that Indonesian President Suharto wanted American approval
192 The Estado Novo came to power under military coup on May 28. 1926, overthrowing Portugal's First
Republic (1910-1926), which itself had succeeded the monarchy of Portgual in 1910. De Oliveira
Marques, 253-256
193 Jos6 Ramos-Horta, Funu: The Unfinished Saga of East Timor, (Trenton: The Red Sea Press, 1987), 3
194 Anthony Pecotich and Clifford J. Shultz, II, eds., Handbook of Markets and Economies: East Asia,
Southeast Asia, Australia, New Zealand, (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 2006), 200
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or at least a promise not to interfere in any attempt to invade East Timor. The United States,
having just lost the Viet Nam war very badly needed to maintain an ally in Southeast Asia
in the fight against Communism, something that Suharto had repeatedly demonstrated his
ability to do.'"1 Since 1949, the United States State Department had regarded the lands of
Southeast Asia as an important source of raw materials for both Japan and Western Europe.
At the same time, the Cold War increasingly framed American foreign policy decisions,
making this part of the world critical for the United States. In 1958, the CIA sponsored a
coup attempt on Sukarno, the first president of newly independent Indonesia. In 1965, the
Indonesian military, 1200 of which had been trained by the United States, announced they
had preempted a coup by alleged Communist forces within the military.196 This catapulted
General Suharto into the national spotlight. Two years later he became the second
president of Indonesia. Described by James Reston of the New York Times as the "gleam of
light in Asia", Suharto's forces were no doubt inspired by the mid-60's success of
American-backed anti-Communist efforts in neighboring Viet Nam.' 97
In the 1980s, Jose Ramos-Horta of FRETILIN appealed to Australia to act as an
intermediary in negotiations with the Indonesian government for East Timor's
independence. Kay Rala Xanana Gusmdo of the Conselho Nacional da Resistancia
Maubere (CNRM) had also articulated his willingness to speak with the Indonesian
government without any preconditions. Then, in 1991, Portugal unsuccessfully sued
195 Jack Anderson,"Another Slaughter", The San Francisco Chronicle, 9 November 1979, 61
196 Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on U.S. Policy, "Military Assistance and
Training in East and Southeast Asia", 9 2nd Congress, 1' sess., 12 April 1971
197 James Reston, "Washington: A Gleam of Light in Asia", The New York Times, 19 June 1966, E12
110
Australia at the World Court for entering into the Timor Gap Treaty with Indonesia for
development of oil and gas reserves in the Timor Sea. 98 In 1992, Gusmio was jailed by
the Indonesian government and, despite repeated calls for action by the international
community, nothing much would change for East Timor until the ramifications of the Asian
economic crisis of 1997 began to manifest themselves in Indonesia's political realm.
11mor-Leste
Just prior to Suharto's resignation in 1998, members of the East Timorese diaspora
met in Lisbon to draft a document that proclaimed the rights of the East Timorese people.
The CNRM, still under the direction of a jailed Gusmio in Jakarta, transformed itself into
the Conselho Nacional da Resistdncia Timorense (CNRT) and renewed the push for
independence. Suharto's vice-president, Bacharuddin Jusuf Habibie, declared in the
summer of 1998 that East Timor would be granted a special status within the Indonesian
nation and agreed to work with the United Nations on the issue of East Timor's autonomy.
The United Nations established the UN Mission in East Timor (UNAMET). In a surprise
move in January of 1999, President Habibie announced that a "consultation" would be
held in East Timor to decide between autonomy or independence that could come as early
as 2000. He believed that granting the right for semi-autonomy would give Indonesia and
his new presidency international recognition, but he had not discussed his plans with the
very powerful Indonesian military prior to the announcement.'9 9 The Front Bersama Pro-
198 Rowena Lennox, Fighting Spirit of East Timor: The Life of Martinho da Costa Lopes, (Annandale: Pluto
Press, 2000), xiv-xix
199 Don Greenless and Robert Garran, Deliverance: The Inside Story of East Timor's Fight for Freedom,
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Otonomi Timor Timur (UNIF) was created to push for political support for autonomy, while
pro-Indonesian militias in East Timor stepped up their efforts to dampen pro-independence
movements. It was reported that the Australian Secret Intelligence Service intercepted
multiple communications between the Indonesian military under the direction of General
Wiranto and those same militias. On May 5, 1999 the United Nations, Portugal and
Indonesia met to discuss the conduct of the vote that would be held. It was here that the
Indonesian military gained the role of security guarantor for the voting process. Australia
supported this arrangement over the objections of Portugal and the United States. Despite
the threats of militia violence, FALINTIL guerillas laid down their arms and most of the
country turned out to vote in August of 1999. The results were overwhelmingly in favor of
independence (78.5%).200
The ensuing post-referendum violence by militias sympathetic to the losing interests
displaced about 75% of the population and mass destruction wiped out about 70% of the
infrastructure and resources of East Timor.20' A request for help led to the International
Force for East Timor (INTERFET) arrival in late September. This author participated in
Operation Stabilise with INTERFET in early 2000 while serving with the 15 th Marine
Expeditionary Unit. The United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor
(UNTAET) began its 2.5-year role as caretaker of the country with Sergio Vieira de Mello as
its administrator. He created the 15-member National Consultative Council (NCC) on
November 22, 1999, which consisted of seven members of the CNRT, three members of
(Crows Nest: George Allen & Unwin, 2002), xi
200 Lennox, xxi-xxv
201 World Bank, "Report of the Joint Assessment Mission to East Timor", 1999
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non-CNRT parties, one member of the Catholic Church, one member of the transitional
administration and three members from UNTAET.202 The United Nations administered
Consolidated Fund for East Timor (CFET), which provided direct budget support and would
wind up spending approximately $1.7b by 2006.203 The World Bank also drafted the
Transition Support Strategy and along with the Asian Development Bank, created the Trust
Fund for East Timor (TFET) which was responsible for approximately $147m in aid
projects.204
Recognizing a need to be more inclusive, Vieira de Mello reorganized the NCC into
the National Council and added representation from all 13 districts in East Timor as well as
representatives of the Protestant and Muslim communities, NGOs, farmers, business
groups, women's groups and student organizations. He also created the East Timor
Transitional Administration (ETTA) to increase the number of Timorese involved in the civil
service. This set the field for the 2001 elections for Constituent Assembly.205
The CNRT dissolved itself just prior to the elections so that all of its members could
participate in the elections as individual parties, but this presented a bit of confusion for
the traditional power structure since most of the village and hamlet leadership in the 13
districts were longtime members of the CNRM/CNRT. After the August 30, 2001
election,12 of the 13 districts' representatives were FRETILIN, as were 43 of the 75 other
seats in the Assembly.20 6 This group would then become the Parliament of the Democratic
202 Pecotich and Shultz, 201
203 Guteriano Nicolau S. Neves, "The Paradox of Aid in East Timor", (Brasilia: University of Brasilia, 2006)
204 World Bank, Asian Development Bank, "Trust Fund for East Timor", Update No.12, 11 September 2001,
10
205 Pecotich and Shultz, 205
206 Pecotich and Shultz, 208
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Republic of Timor-Leste with Dr. Mari Alkatiri as prime minister and Jos6 Ramos-Horta as
president.20 7 UNTAET dissolved into the UN Mission of Support to East Timor (UNMISET)
and then became the UN Office in Timor-Leste (UNOTIL) in 2005.
Success Story?
Held up as a model for nation-building, evidence of Timor-Leste's fragility was
visible in generally positive reports published by major organizations assisting the new
nation.20 8 Simultaneous decreases in per capita Gross Domestic Product accompanied
increases in the Gross National Income. In the World Bank's latest Country Assistance
Strategy, it has recommended a reduction in reliance on the petroleum sector in favor of
capital development, high-value niche crops for export and tourism. Paradoxically, in the
same report it also recommends that Timor-Leste continue to depend on the petroleum
sector for sustainable wealth. Numerous notes pointed out the weakness of private sector
regulation and identified a large gap between the micro-finance effort and large-scale
enterprise lending programs. This in a country that is 86% rural and has a rapidly growing
youth population. 20 9
In April of 2006, the government removed approximately 30% of its troops from the
military after they protested perceived discrimination against the Loromonu, "westerners",
by the Lorosa'e, "easterners". The ensuing violence resulted in displacement of 10% of the
207 CIA, The World Factbook, [database on-line]; available from
https://www.cia.gov/ibrarv/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/tt.html; Internet; accessed on 5 May
2008
208 World Bank, "International Development Association Country Assistance Strategy for the Democratic
Republic of Timor-Leste for the Period of FY06-FY08", 2005
209 ibid
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national population and a reversion of UNOTIL to a UN mission (UNMIT) along with the
reappearance of international peacekeepers. As recently as February, 2008, near-fatal
attacks on the president and prime minister have reminded the Timorese and the rest of the
world the fragility of the new nation.
Nearly US$4 billion dollars has been spent between 1999 and 2006 on this nation
of approximately 1 million people by the UN, the World Bank, the Asian Development
Bank, AusAID, JICA, USAID and a handful of NGOs like Catholic Relief Services.2 10 With
less than expected to show for their efforts, the international organizations have been
scaling back their support for Timor-Leste. NGOs are no longer able to obtain funding
because of these reduced commitments.
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7.3. Methodological Annex
I conducted field research in Timor-Leste on two separate trips. On the first trip I spent
about a week getting acquainted with Dilli, the capital city, and making contacts. I also
conducted a number of informal interviews to understand general social and political
trends. On the second week, I traveled by
Illustration /: a loacec anguna in Mauoisse, Alnaro
anguna2 11 to the mountain town of Maubisse (see Illustration 7). There I also conducted
211 "anguna", a Timorese term for a flatbed truck that provides the most inexpensive option for inter-town
transport. Typically carries about 40 people and their cargo and costs $3 for a single ride. Rides last 3-5
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informal interviews. I do not speak any of the 22 dialects of Tetum. These are collectively
more widely spoken than the Portuguese national language, which I also do not speak. I
attempted to conduct some formal interviews in Spanish. That was successful with some of
the older citizens I talked to, but I do not feel my answers were accurate enough to
include in this thesis. On the third week, a Timorese co-worker of someone I had met at
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs asked me to go to the Vikeke district with him to experience
the eastern side of country. There I had the opportunity to interview a few village chiefs
and conducted many informal interviews and in exchange for documenting a traditional
ceremony, nahe biti bo'ot, with video, photo and audio (see Illustration 8)212. A few of the
younger Timorese had worked with some Australian NGOs and were able to translate the
local Tetum dialect into English for me.
Just prior to my second trip to Timor-Leste, I was able to arrange some new
meetings in advance. I also met up with an independent researcher who gave me some
additional contacts. I spent most of my time on that trip in the capital city, conducting
interviews both in person and over cell phone. One of my Australia contacts helped me
find a translator to assist me with my interviews. I recorded my interviews on this trip with
a digital recorder. I also hand-wrote all of my interviews in notebooks, as with all of the
others I had conducted.
hours depending on road conditions.
212 "nahe biti bo'ot", a traditional Timorese reconciliation process. Over the course of the ceremony I
witnessed the interplay of the political and ritual of uma lulik as well as the deference to the authority of
the ancestors who came before. For more on this process, see Josh Trindade and Bryant Castro,
"Rethinking Timorese Identity as a Peacebuilding Strategy: the Lorosa'e - Loromonu Conflict from a
Traditional Perspective", (GTZ International Services: 6 June 2007)
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eke prepare tor nahe biti bo'ot at Loymau's house
2008 July 29 - August 17
* Dili district - includes the capital city of Dili
* Ainaro district - includes the mountain town of Maubisse (see Illustration 9)
* Vikeke district - an eastern district on the south coast
119
Illustration 8: the village elders of Suku La
Illustration 9: Sunday morning market at Maubisse, Ainaro
2009 January 24 - January 31
* Bobonaru district - a district on the western side of the country
* Dili district - includes the capital city of Dili
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Illustration 10: Armindo da Costa (translating), X
Number 1, Dili
Aldeia Luis and me (interviewing) in Luis' fouse in
List of Interviewees:
(7) village and hamlet chiefs from the Dili, Vikeke and Bobonaru districts
(3) UN officials from UNOPS
(3) international NGO officials from ARD, The Asia Foundation and NCBA
(2) World Bank officials
(2) researchers at universities in Australia that have studied Timor-Leste extensively
(2) international contractors working for Timor-Leste ministries (Justice, Foreign Affairs)
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(1) team of researchers at La'o Hamutuk, a domestic NGO that monitors development
agencies in Timor-Leste
(1) native independent researcher
(1) former council member of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (CAVR)
(1) official from the National Directorate for Suco Administration, Ministry of State
Administration and Territorial Management
(1) official from the Directorate of Information Technology Services, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs
(1) official from the Coopertiva Cafe Timor coffee-producing collective
(1) Timorese king from the Vikeke district
Self-Introductory Paragraph (used for interview solicitation):
I am a student researching how aid organizations work with countries'
indigenous/traditional social and political systems. I am trying to better understand how
resistance and violent conflict strengthens an oppressed community and what potential
that creates for state and institution building. I have been interested in Timor-Leste in
particular because of my involvement in peacekeeping operations there in 2000. Do you
have some time to discuss your thoughts on this?
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7.4. The King and I - An Account of a Research Trip to the
Lacluta Sub-District
I am sharing coffee and cigarettes with George Francisco Reis Carvalho. "Kiki" tells me
that we will probably leave for Vikeke around 2pm and asks if I mind waiting. He expects
the journey will be maybe 5 hours but we need a few more things for the trip and should
make it before dark.
I sent out a number of emails last month when I decided that I was definitely coming to
Timor-Leste to do my research. I got a lot of responses and just as many referrals and
pieces of advice. One such chain of referrals led me to Casimiro Reis, who works at
UNOPS in Caicoli, Dili. After some email and SMS-tag I managed to make it to his office
this morning where he asked me if I would like to travel to Vikeke where I could talk to
some local people and experience some local culture. I would have to travel for a few
days, maybe do some long hiking and, by the way, everyone is leaving in 2 hours. Of
course, I jumped at the opportunity. After a quick stop at Kiki's to get introduced I power-
walked to the internet cafe, printed out some papers and checked email, then went back
to the hostel where I repacked, put the pack in a locker and stuffed my satchel for the 4-
day trip. I'm taking a lot of notes, so I hope this reads well:
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August 7, 14:00 - We are on our way. It is me, Kiki and Malongo in a Suzuki jeep. Just
before we got in, Kiki explained to me that Timor-Leste has five kingdoms: Los Palos, Oe-
kusi, Ainaru, Likisa and Vikeke. He told me, that in fact, Casimiro's father is the king of
Vikeke, the 7th in a paternal line that extends back a few centuries. So, a few minutes into
the trip and I already have my first surprise. This should be an interesting few days.
16:00 - We stop just before Baukau at a gas stop to pick up some water and beer. I am
told that beer keeps you awake while you are driving. I guess I am glad that we have
already driven through the mountain-coast roads (they were like Pacific Coast Highway).
19:00 - It's dark now and we were supposed to have been there already but the roads are
much worse than we anticipated.
20:00 - We arrive in Vikeke after 196km (122 miles). The last quarter of the journey took
as long as the first three-quarters on account of the horrible road conditions. We pull up to
the house where Casimiro's father, the king, and Francisco "Chiky" de Carvalho live.
Chiky explains that he is in charge of the medical facilities in the district, which includes
22 clinics. As we all relax around some coffee he tells me about the lack of electrical
power because of recent problems with Vikeke's power generators. He has a generator at
the house that is keeping a light or two on, but most importantly keeping the vaccines in
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his refrigerator cold.
20:30 - It is time to eat dinner. The men sit down to eat at the table, so I assume that the
women and children have already eaten (we were late after all). One of the treats at the
meal was a sweet cassava, caprilia?, which is local to Vikeke. During the resistance this
was the staple food of the Falintil. I am enjoying my food but I notice that everyone is
eating a bit faster than me. I am told that it is common for Timorese to eat fast. This also
comes from the times of occupation.
21:30 - Before we sit around after dinner to chat, I am shown the room we will be
sleeping in. The plan is to get up early and head to the sub-district after breakfast. Politics
seems central to the people I am talking to here, but I am told that is more common for the
people in the villages (like the ones we will be visiting) to know more about the king than
the president of the country. Chiky tries to explain to me the factionalizing of the political
parties in Timor-Leste after 2001, but I get a little bit lost. He talks about FRETILIN Radical,
FRETILIN Movemento and FRETILIN Murasa. I knew that the CNRT had disbanded that
year, but he tells me that it came back as a new political party and then became the AMB.
I have to read more about this. Chiky tells me about the violence that occurred in Vikeke
in 2007. Apparently there is a long-standing rivalry between those in the area I am in now
who speak Bahasa Indonesia and Tetum and another group in the district who speak 2
other dialects of Tetum. That other group came to this part of Vikeke and burned all the
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cars, set all the roofs ablaze with gasoline and broke all the windows. He says this is why
he still has a metal roof and chicken-wire/bars where the window frames are.
August 8, 8:00 - I get up, brush my teeth and take a wadoo shower with a bucket. After
breakfast I go outside and notice the burned out minivan in front of the house next door.
08:40 - We begin our drive up the mountain to Lacluta sub-district. Kiki, the king and I get
in the jeep. Malongo jumps onto a motorbike with someone else heading up there too.
09:30 - We stop to pick up tua sabu, a "wine" that is supposed to be like soju or sake. I
am shown a small cup of it and as I reach to grab it I realize that the cup is on fire. It has a
blue flame that you can't see in the daylight...must be strong!
10:30 - Uh oh. We were climbing a steep road and we slipped backwards and ran over a
dog. The villager was not happy. The gist of the conversation was that the villager should
come by and see the king later to be compensated.
11:00 - We arrive at Suku (village) Dilor in the Lacluta sub-district. After we sit and have a
coffee we walk over to Suku Lalini. The terrain is now too rugged to drive any further
unless we have a motorbike.
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11:20 - We arrive at Loymau's house, Loymau is a very animated speaker, with his
sweeping gestures and widely varying intonations. We have lunch here and drink coconut
juice and tua mutin, a white palm wine which tastes much smoother than the tua I tried in
Dili. I notice a driller bee flying around the back porch. I am used to seeing them in New
York at my parents' house but the ones here are the size of small birds and are pretty loud.
I am introduced to a woman here who is apparently 105 years old. She still has her
eyesight, teeth and mental capacity. She likes to come her hair a lot. I can't imagine how
many things she has seen over the last 100 years.
15:00 - I asked Loymau about the World Bank projects I am looking at but he really
doesn't know about them. Another man named Casimiro comes by. I want to ask him, but
I told to wait until after 5pm when everyone is more relaxed. I am generally pretty good
about sensing cultural differences from my own and adapting, but it appears I am still even
a bit too fast at bringing up business here in Timor-Leste. Kiki and I are offered corn husk-
rolled cigarettes with natural tobacco. We both laugh in amazement about how instantly
sobering these large cigarettes are. We had been drinking a lot of tua mutin by this point.
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Laini (Xefe Suku Laurantno)
-5 akdesa (Mocrade, )
-11 konsellu members
-1 church
Lacuta
-pop. 6000
Ahait (Xefe Suku Malongo)
-5 aidea
-11 konsellu members
Dilor (Xete Sku Abillo)
-5 aideia
-11 konsellu members
-1 church
Motolo (Xefe Suku Sebast6n)
-5 aideia
-11 konsrelu members
-1 church
Illustration 11: map of the Lacluta sub-district in Vikeke, based on
conversations with the village chiefs (xefe suku)
17:00 - Kiki and I head back to Suku Dilor where I grab my notebook. I meet Claudino
here. He is 24 and works with an Australian NGO, Connect East Timor, that is helping
install radio communications between the suku of the subdistrict. On the way back to
Suku Lalini we run into the villager whose dog we ran over. Kiki asks him if he has seen
the king yet, but the villager seems reluctant to visit him. Kiki and I each give him $10 in
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compensation and the villager says the issue is settled.
18:30 - We all mill about the front porch area waiting for everyone to show up for the
ceremony.
21:00 - The discussions begin with the placing of the betelnut baskets in front of the
elders, who are about 15 in total. Introductions and stories follow. I follow along as best as
I can. An interesting fellow sits down next to me in the outer ring of 10 men, but I never
catch his name. He is quite animated but a little bit off-kilter. I keep thinking of O.D.B.
from Wu-Tang Clan as we talk. I am told later that Casimiro, who I had met at Loymau's
house received a spirit at 20:00.
23:30 - Malongo pulls me inside the house and tells me it is time to eat dinner. It's just me
and him and the women and children (about 30 total) in the house. After dinner I meet
another man named Malongo, the Xefe Suku of Ahaik. Dino is here and he helps me
translate with Xefe Suku Malongo, who says that he doesn't know too much about the
World Bank projects. I will ask again tomorrow though. He tells me about the layout of the
4 suku in subdistrict as well as the distance between each. He also tells me that the total
population of the sub-district is 6000.
August 9, 00:30 -The discussions have ended for the evening, and now it's dinner time. I
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already ate inside the house but I have to eat again. We have rice, barria (it's like eggplant,
but bitter), greens and noodles that taste a bit like tuna helper (see Illustration 12). The red
chiles that are on the side are super spicy. Now I get to try the tua suba. It is like a whiskey
version of sake. It feels a bit like drinking rubbing alcohol or gasoline though. A sip hits
your stomach like a lit match. I meet Agus, another 20-something who is studying to be a
doctor. He tells me that he is learning Spanish now because his classes are all taught by
Cuban doctors. Chiky had explained to me the night before about the influx of Cuban
doctors in Timor-Leste and the need to know Spanish now.
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02:00 -The king decides to return to Suku Dilor. I am tired so I go along with him. We
wind up sharing a room in the house we had parked the jeep in front of earlier.
10:00 - I wake up to discover that the king is waiting for me to eat my breakfast. I shower
and brush fast so I don't have to keep him waiting (see Illustration 13).
ng and I in Suku Dilor, Vikeke
10:30 - The king and I go on a walking tour of the suku. He says he wants me take photos.
I notice a lot of the children are rolling tires around with sticks, much like I have seen
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pictures of children doing back home in New York a few generations ago. Even the pull-
toy trucks and cars they have here seem to come from the same era.
11:00 - We arrive at Suku Lalini where I take a bunch of pictures and socialize for a few
hours (see Illustration 14).
Illustration 14: spending the afternoon with villagers of Suku Lalini, Vikeke
13:30 - I just missed the spearing of the boar we are eating for dinner! I saw the spears
come out, but I was too late coming around the corner with the camera. I got a coconut
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though. Everyone was drinking and eating one.
14:30 - We are back in Suku Dilor. It's lunchtime. The king suggests a siesta, so I decide to
catch up on some reading.
16:30 - Heading back to Suku Lalini for the second night of the ceremonies...
20:00 - There are more discussions, then hugs all-around, then dinner.
23:00 - The dancing has just started (see Illustration 15). It is all of the teenage boys and
girls in the village. I am told that they will dance until the morning because the teenagers
rarely get the opportunity to show this level of intimacy in Timorese culture. I was
discussing relationships with a young man last night, and he explained to me that if a boy
and a girl are caught having sex before either is married it would bring shame on the
families and require payment of something like 5 cows to the offended party. Now that the
ceremony is over I should be able to ask a lot more questions. Kiki is helping me with the
translations. He tells me that he will continue to wear all-black clothing for a year since
his father's passing in the spring.
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suku leaders:
Lalini Xefe Suku Laurantino (elected in 1999)
Ahaik Xefe Suku Malongo (elected in 2005, succeeding Jermano 1999-2005; term ends in
2009)
Dilor Xefe Suku Abilio
Motolo Xefe Suku Sebasti6n
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structure:
each suku in Lacluta has 5 aldeia (hamlets)
each konsellu suku has 11 members, so the sub-district Conselho do Posto has 44
there are Catholic churches in Motolo, Dilor and Lalini
CEP:
Xefe Suku Malongo said the World Bank project had good results here. They built roads
and houses and did not interfere with the local government. They were partners with JEP
and the EU. Xefe Suku Laurantino also had similar good experience. No interference in his
suku from the World Bank. He said that 106 houses were built. They were partners with
INAP, although this part I didn't really understand what he meant.
In general, the idea that the "banco mundial" worked with or imposed a konsellu suku
does not seem to ring too many bells in the suku here. In fact, whenever I ask about the
konsellu suku people always first assume I am talking about Portugal's influence on the
government. People all remember the Indonesian occupation quite vividly and talk a lot
about Portugal. On a few occasions, I have heard mention of three occupiers: the
Portuguese, the Indonesians and the "internationals". My impression from conversations
here and in Maubisse is that the 4-year span of the project is too small a blip in the bigger
500-year oral history for people to remember. People here in Timor-Leste think in longer
terms then the foreigners.
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August 10 - A few more thoughts as we drive back...someone had explained to me the
languages here in the sub-district. I likened his explanation to Blade Runner where they
spoke a Spanish-Japanese-German-other hybrid language called "city speech". Here, the
speak is a mash-up of Tetum-Portuguese-Bahasa Indonesia. Another analogy here, but this
one is to Star Trek III (why all the sci-fi?). The planet created by the Genesis device had
closely-spaced contrasting biospheres. Here in Timor-Leste, we drove from lush, dense
forest with tropical vegetation to a rolling green hills with mist and jagged mountains to
grassy plains to the brown grass and palm trees of a mild clime like Sicily or southern
California. The transition across all those was only a few hours!
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